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[W]hat this court has decided to do is to apply a literal 
interpretation of both code sections. . . . There are no cases on 
point.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Assisted reproductive techniques (“ARTs”) have brought 
significant changes to the arrangements and choices some people 
make about procreation. Complex new technologies inevitably 
generate mistakes;2 assisted reproduction is no exception.3 In 
resolving these disputes, legislatures have left in place and courts 
have continued to rely on family law statutes that were drafted before 
any of the new procreative techniques developed. Applying these 
older statutes to disputes involving ARTs is problematic. When 
courts face situations that have not arisen before, and indeed could 
not have arisen before, they cannot legislate, but they also cannot 
escape deciding whether and how to interpret and apply codes that 
are arguably anachronistic.  
Judicial reasoning about new issues often proceeds by analogy, 
but it is critical that the analogy chosen be apt both factually and in 
terms of underlying policy. In 1990, I argued that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s choice of analogy in Baby M,4 the first high 
visibility ARTs dispute, was seriously flawed.5 Baby M involved a 
 1. Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal at 43, Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 1-02-CP-010574). 
 2. See generally CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK 
TECHNOLOGIES (Princeton University Press 1999) (1984). 
 3. See generally Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2003). 
Professor Bender’s intriguing article illumines that however unusual their facts, ARTs mistakes 
are not simply idiosyncratic, but constitute a category in their own right. Id. at 4–5. Bender 
criticizes courts’ resolution of ARTs mistake cases both for genetic essentialism and for gender 
and race bias. Id. at 4. I make no attempt here at any definitive statement about the role of 
genetics in parental status. I do believe, however, that Bender under-appreciates the degree of 
convergence and reciprocal entanglement between genetic connection and intentions. If that 
convergence is ignored, it is more difficult to identify factors that do and should influence 
parentage decisions. 
 4. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988). 
 5. Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An 
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 372–98 (1990) (arguing that the 
Baby M court inappropriately assessed the surrogacy agreement through a pre-modern lens of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/8
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dispute over the enforcement of a surrogacy contract between the 
surrogate mother and the intending parents.6 In refusing to enforce 
the parties’ contract, the Baby M court held that the facts at hand 
were “the same as if Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead had had the child 
out of wedlock, intended or unintended.”7 The court analogized to 
family law frameworks of unwed parents, adoption and baby selling 
to settle the dispute. These analogies were inapposite then, and, for 
reasons I explain below, they remain so today. Even where 
legislatures have refused to modernize relevant family statutes, courts 
that treat ARTs disputes the same as they treat disputes arising from 
coital relations have not sufficiently reflected on the very significant 
differences between traditional and assisted procreation. This 
approach yields results that are deeply arbitrary and often perverse. 
A few states have adopted new statutes that specifically speak to 
ARTs issues.8 Also, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws proposed first the Status of Children of Assisted 
Conception Act,9 and then a significantly revised Uniform Parentage 
Act,10 both of which seek to address problems emerging from ARTs 
disputes. While those statutory efforts improve the resolution of 
certain kinds of problems,11 they do not provide a template that is 
conventional procreational and family patterns). 
 6. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235–37. Mary Beth Whitehead agreed to bear a child for 
William and Elizabeth Stern. Id. at 1235. Ms. Whitehead was artificially inseminated with Mr. 
Stern’s sperm. Id. When Ms. Whitehead changed her mind about turning over the child to the 
Sterns, they sued to enforce the ARTs agreement. Id. at 1237. 
 7. Id. at 1238 (emphasis added). 
 8. Four states, Delaware, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming, have adopted the Uniform 
Parentage Act 2002 amendments. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT General Statutory Note (amended 
2002), 9B U.L.A. 6–7 (Supp. 2005). Two states, North Dakota and Virginia, adopted the 
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act of 1988. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN 
OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT General Statutory Note (1988), 9C U.L.A. 366 (2001). 
 9. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988), 9C U.L.A. 367 
(2001), superceded by UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701–809 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 6, 39–
50 (Supp. 2005). Articles 7 and 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act, as amended in 2002, replace 
the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act as the official recommendation of 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Id. 
 10. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2005). 
 11. The 2002 revisions to the UPA were written in part to address disputes arising out of 
assisted reproductive technique agreements. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT arts. 7, 8 (amended 2002), 
9B U.L.A. 39–50 (Supp. 2005) (arranging parental status based on ARTs and providing for 
enforcement of court-validated gestational agreements). The prefatory comment to Article 8 of 
the Act states that because gestational agreements are controversial, a child born pursuant to a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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fully adequate to the constantly evolving challenges presented by 
ARTs. 
In grappling with those challenges, a number of courts have 
adopted an intent-based approach when confronting ARTs disputes.12 
I have argued that intentions are at the heart of what makes us 
human.13 Segmentation of the physical processes of reproduction 
allows and indeed requires choices that are far more intentional than 
those made in previous eras. When one of the parties to an ARTs 
agreement wants to change his or her mind,14 intentions and 
expectations that are deliberate, planned and bargained for should be 
enforced.15 When I urged this approach, I did not foresee how 
unplanned events within the generally planned ARTs environment 
could create daunting disputes of a different type. Disputes arising 
from a mistake by a third party professional thrust individuals with 
gestational agreement is entitled to have his or her status clarified. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 
(amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 44–45 (Supp. 2005). However, the Act expressly allows States not 
ready to deal with that issue to omit this part of the UPA without doing damage to the other 
provisions. Id. Even if the new provisions were adopted, they would not directly address the 
issues raised by the illustrative case discussed in this paper. 
 12. Other courts have taken different approaches than that of the New Jersey court. 
Several courts have chosen to enforce ARTs contracts. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 
180 (N.Y. 1998) (stating that an agreement between parties using ARTs “should generally be 
presumed valid and binding, and [should be] enforced in any dispute between [the parties]”). 
Other courts have suggested that contracts would be the preferred way to resolve ARTs 
disputes. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (“[A]greement[s] 
regarding disposition of any untransferred pre-embryos . . . should be presumed valid and 
should be enforced.”). But see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1056–58 (Mass. 2000) 
(upholding order enjoining wife’s use of frozen preembryos on the basis of public policy and of 
the husband’s interest in avoiding having children, despite provisions in the couple’s initial 
consent form); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719–20 (N.J. 2001) (refusing to enforce a contract 
involving IVF because parties’ intent was not clear and because the interests of both parties and 
the possibility of their reconsidering earlier decisions should first be weighed). 
 13. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, Humanness, in HUMANHOOD: ESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
1, 12–16 (1979); see also Shultz, supra note 5, at 321–72. In his essay, Fletcher, a bioethicist, 
identified criteria relevant to determining humanness or personhood, including possessing self-
awareness, a sense of time, and a sense of futurity (purposiveness). FLETCHER, supra, at 12–16. 
 14. One can undertake IVF procedures, recruit a gamete donor, or perform AI without 
having intentions.  
 15. Shultz, supra note 5, at 303. Various courts have quoted this language to support 
enforcement of ARTs contracts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) 
(upholding surrogacy agreement and declaring intended genetic mother, not surrogate mother, 
as legal mother); Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (enforcing an 
agreement by which plaintiff was granted paternity rights to a child conceived by artificial 
insemination). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/8
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no previous relationship and no mutually bargained for expectations 
into conflict with one another over parental status. This is the 
problem I address here. 
The number of ARTs lawsuits California’s courts have faced 
suggests that the state’s citizens use assisted reproduction rather 
frequently. Known for being on the cutting edge of social and cultural 
as well as technological development, California provides an apt 
context for analyzing the distinctive legal issues that characterize 
assisted reproduction. A recent California case, Robert B. v. Susan 
B.16 (“Susan’s case” or “Robert v. Susan”), provides a heart-
wrenching illustration of an ARTs mistake that is not amenable to an 
intent-based approach to resolution. As was true in the Baby M 
decision, the courts deciding Susan’s case applied statutes that were 
not drafted to govern the particular factual issues confronting them. 
Judges fell back on inapposite analogies to coital reproduction, and, 
in so doing, they imposed poorly reasoned and pragmatically 
damaging results. Both the trial and appellate courts claimed that they 
were following the plain meaning of the statutes, and were simply 
declining to consider policy or fill gaps left by the legislature.17 
Certainly, legislatures could and should address the disputes that are 
arising more frequently from the growing use of ARTs. But the 
prospect of rapid or thorough legislative resolution seems slim, given 
the seeming inability of many legislatures to address contested social 
issues. In the meantime, courts should understand that interpreting 
and applying statutes inherently involves discretion. Literal reading 
of outdated statutes and reliance on unpersuasive analogies are 
consequential judicial choices.  
Before discussing the issues illustrated by Susan’s case, I should 
confess that my client lost, so perhaps this paper is a species of 
 16. Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 
Robert B. v. Susan B., No. S117664, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 6671 (Cal. Sept. 10, 2003). 
 17. For example, the Court of Appeal opinion comments that Susan’s “appeal to the ‘clear 
social policy supporting single parenthood’ would more appropriately be directed to the 
Legislature.” Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787. The trial judge noted that “[w]hat this court 
has decided to do is to apply a literal interpretation of both code sections.” Reporter’s 
Transcript on Appeal, supra note 1, at 43. For a case making a similar plea for legislative 
direction, see Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
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academic sour grapes.18 However, gauging by the final appellate 
opinion,19 we lost for reasons that are unpersuasive, at least to me. If 
better reasons had been offered for the outcome, I would still be 
dissatisfied, but less globally so. Reasonable people could differ 
about the optimal outcome of Robert v. Susan, but the opinions and 
rulings in the case provide another distressing instance of courts’ 
failure to recognize and adapt to the differences between ARTs 
situations and traditional parentage disputes. 
 I offer one other prefatory observation before diving into the 
details of this difficult case. People sometimes ask why so much 
attention is paid to a problem that affects only a small number of 
people. My answer is that these cases force us to think about some of 
our most fundamental values. What makes a family? Who is a 
parent? In determining who to recognize as a legal parent, we reveal 
our attitudes about the body, biology and genetics, about psychology 
and environment, about human connection and responsibility, about 
the role of intentions and plans in our lives and in our law. 
Part II provides a sketch of the facts and the litigation history of 
Robert v. Susan. Part III explores California’s statutory scheme for 
paternity and evaluates its application in ARTs disputes generally and 
in Susan’s case in particular. Part IV assesses the relevance of marital 
status to resolution of parentage disputes, especially in ARTs 
conflicts like the one between Robert and Susan. Part V examines the 
interests of the child and considers whether a different or broader 
standard should be applied to resolve parentage problems in the 
context of ARTs. Part VI summarizes and concludes. 
 18. After initially serving as a consultant to Marc Gradstein of Gradstein and Gorman 
(who represented Susan throughout the dispute over parental status), I eventually became co-
counsel, working on all briefs and arguing the appeal in California’s Sixth District Court of 
Appeal. 
 19. The Susan B. opinion did not reflect the oral argument. Questions raised by the panel 
at argument covered even wider ground than the broad briefing and argument offered by the 
parties. By contrast, the opinion was narrow almost to the point of being formulaic. The 
thinness of the analysis is more suggestive of a desire not to be reversed than of meaningful 
engagement with the facts and issues of this complex case of first impression. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/8
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II. HISTORY OF ROBERT V. SUSAN20  
A. Facts  
My client, Susan, is a single woman who tried repeatedly but 
unsuccessfully to conceive a child through in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
using her own eggs and her then-fiance’s sperm. After careful 
consideration of her options, Susan decided to make a final IVF 
attempt, this time using not only donor sperm but also donor ova. She 
purchased genetic material from donors who sought no parental 
rights, and who specifically intended to donate to someone who 
would gestate the embryos and rear the resulting child. This last IVF 
cycle created a number of high quality embryos, which her fertility 
doctor was to transfer to her womb in June of 2000. To Susan’s great 
joy, she became pregnant, and in early 2001 she gave birth to her son, 
Daniel. Susan continued at her full-time job and Daniel enjoyed 
daycare during the week. Together, they were a happy and healthy 
family unit.  
When Daniel was about ten months old, an inspector from the 
California Medical Board contacted Susan, who then called her 
fertility doctor.21 A few days after Christmas, the doctor came to her 
home to tell her that a mistake had been made. The embryo from 
which Daniel grew was an embryo from a married couple in 
treatment at the same fertility practice during the same time period as 
Susan. Susan later learned that the fertility center had known about 
the mistake in a matter of minutes after it was made, but did not tell 
either Susan or the couple until they were forced to do so by a 
whistleblower, a former employee of the practice, who had notified 
 20. The following information is derived from conversation with my client, Susan B., and 
co-counsel Marc Gradstein. Except where otherwise noted, the facts can be found in the 
following sources: the Sixth District Court of Appeal decision, Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Appellant’s Opening Brief in the Sixth District Court of 
Appeal, Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 1-02-CP-
010574); Respondent’s Opening Brief, Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (No. 1-02-CP-010574). 
 21. See Harriet Chiang, Mom Awarded $1 Million Over Embryo Mix-Up, S.F. CHRON., 
Aug. 4, 2004, at B3. 
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the state medical board about the error, triggering the board’s 
investigation.22 
As Susan remembers it, her doctor told her that the couple were 
“nice folks,” that they wanted to meet Susan and to see Daniel, and 
that he thought things could be worked out in an informal meeting. 
Reluctantly, Susan agreed to the doctor’s suggestion that he give her 
name to the couple. She invited them to her home in early 2002. 
When Robert and his wife, Denise, came to Susan’s home, they 
brought with them the daughter they had borne as a result of 
treatment on the same day at the same fertility practice.23 Early in the 
conversation, Susan was stunned and outraged when she heard what 
she perceived to be a non-negotiable demand. The couple seemed to 
view Daniel as their son, a genetic twin of their youngest child. They 
wanted custody of Daniel and insisted that Susan turn him over to 
them immediately. Susan refused. Two weeks later, Robert sued for 
paternity and full custody, requesting that the court order immediate 
genetic testing that he believed would show that Daniel was his son. 
Denise also filed an action asking to be declared Daniel’s mother. At 
this point, Susan hired a lawyer. 
B. Litigation History 
The trial court began hearing the paternity action in the spring of 
2002, and, after receiving briefing on the issue, took up the request 
for genetic testing. After several hearings, the judge ordered the 
testing,24 issuing a stay to allow Susan’s lawyers to file for a Writ of 
Prohibition. Both the District Court of Appeal and the California 
Supreme Court refused to grant review, and genetic testing went 
forward in the late spring of 2002. 
To no one’s surprise, DNA tests showed that Robert was Daniel’s 
genetic father and that Robert and Denise’s child was a genetically 
 22. Id. The nightmare of continuing litigation and the continuing struggle over Daniel’s 
custody forced Susan to mortgage her home and also cost her her job as an interior decorator 
because she missed so much time at work. Id. 
 23. The child was born to Denise from an embryo transfer the same day that Susan had 
been treated.  
 24. The judge based her order on California Family Code Sections 7630(c) and 7551. For 
the text of these provisions, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(c) (West 2004); Id. § 7551. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/8
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related sibling. In preparation for their treatment, Robert and Denise 
had also purchased ova, so neither Daniel nor the other child was 
genetically related to Denise. Shortly after the genetic test report 
came back, the trial court, after further briefing and argument, 
declared that Robert was Daniel’s father and that Susan, the gestator, 
was Daniel’s mother. The judge eventually also held that Denise 
lacked standing to pursue her claim to be named Daniel’s mother. 
Susan appealed the ruling of Robert’s paternity and Denise appealed 
her dismissal from the case. 
After extensive briefing, the Sixth District of the California Court 
of Appeal heard argument in May of 2002. The argument covered a 
wide range of topics and lasted several hours. In June, the Court 
issued a brief opinion affirming all of the trial judge’s rulings. The 
opinion did not reflect the depth of the argument. The holding on 
Robert’s paternity was affirmed in four short paragraphs on the 
ground that California Family Code Section 7613(b), the section on 
which Susan based much of her appeal, did not literally apply to the 
dispute. Spending more than twice as much space on Denise’s claim, 
which had been treated at argument as almost entirely implausible, 
the Court concluded that because Denise had neither a genetic nor a 
gestational relationship to Daniel, she was not “an interested person” 
under Family Code Section 7650, and therefore lacked standing to 
seek a declaration of parental relationship. Susan petitioned for 
review by the California Supreme Court, but review was denied in 
the summer of 2003. 
III. THE CALIFORNIA STATUTORY SCHEME FOR PATERNITY  
Important real world events preceded the legal struggle in Susan’s 
case. Particularly crucial were the mistaken embryo transfer itself, the 
professionals’ decision not to disclose the error at the time it 
occurred,25 and, after the error was reported months later to the state 
 25. In a license revocation hearing, the doctor in Susan’s case “acknowledged that he 
opted not to inform his patients because he thought silence was ‘the best thing for them.’ He 
also feared ‘a violent battle’ between [Susan] and the couple over the rights to the implanted 
embryos.” Mary Anne Ostrom, Doctor Recounts Embryo-Mistake Drama, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Jan. 13, 2005, at 15A. The Medical Board of California revoked the doctor’s license on 
March 29, 2005, after the presiding Administrative Law Judge stated “nothing short of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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medical board, Susan’s decision at her physician’s urging to allow 
the doctor to give her name to Robert and his wife.26 Had any one of 
these events occurred differently, the dispute might never have 
arisen. However, once the events unfolded as they did, the first 
critical legal event in Robert’s quest for paternal rights was the trial 
court’s order for genetic testing. 
A. The Traditional Paternity Framework 
Like many other states, California adopted much of its basic 
statutory scheme for determining parental status from the 1973 
Uniform Parentage Act.27 California maintains a “conclusive” marital 
presumption of paternity and specified the grounds for rebutting that 
presumption.28 Various minor changes were made to the statutory 
revocation will restore to the public confidence that this type of behavior will not be tolerated 
by the medical profession.” Mary Anne Ostrom, Board Revokes Doctor’s License, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 30, 2005, at B1. The doctor appealed the Medical Board’s decision to 
revoke his license. 
 26. In explaining her willingness to cooperate with Dr. Katz’ suggestion, Susan described 
the gratitude and trust she felt at the time toward the doctor who had helped her to achieve her 
much-desired pregnancy. Had she refused, the issue would have shifted to whether the doctor 
could be ordered to disclose Susan’s identity to Robert. This is a complex and interesting 
question in its own right, but given a patient’s right to confidentiality, it is quite possible that no 
such duty would have been imposed. That this entire struggle might have been avoided had her 
“trusted” doctor not taken it upon himself to “advise” Susan, incorrectly as it turned out, is 
tragic. The doctor may simply have been irrationally optimistic, but his intentions seem more 
likely to have been directed to self- rather than patient-protection. Dr. Katz should have 
suggested that Susan retain counsel. 
 27. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001), codified at CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 7600 (West 2004). 
 28. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2004). The quotation marks around “conclusive” 
reflect the fact that the presumption applies provided the husband is not “impotent or sterile,” 
and except that under section 7541 a husband, a child by their guardian ad litum, or a presumed 
father under section 7611 may within two years of the child’s birth prove his paternity by 
means of blood tests. Id.; Id. § 7541. This opportunity for presumed fathers was created by the 
California legislature in apparent reaction to Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In 
Michael H., the court held that the husband was conclusively presumed to be the legal father of 
the child born during marriage despite definitive proof of the genetic paternity of another man. 
Id.; see also Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for 
California to Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 687–
88 (2003) (citing Mindy S. Halpern, Comment, Father Knows Best—But Which Father? 
California’s Presumption of Legitimacy Loses Its Conclusiveness: Michael H. v. Gerald D. and 
Its Aftermath, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 275, 277 (1991)) (noting the close proximity of the 
modification of section 7541(b) to the Michael H. decision as evidence that the change was 
made in response to the decision). 
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framework in the 1990s. At that time, the conclusive marital 
presumption was narrowed slightly,29 extensive provision was made 
to seek and give effect to voluntary declarations of paternity,30 and 
terminology was updated to substitute the language of “genetic” tests 
for “blood” tests in some, but not all, of the Code’s parentage 
provisions.31 Nothing has been done, however, to address the changes 
and choices made possible by modern techniques of assisted 
reproduction.32 This failure to adapt to dramatically different 
circumstances of procreation has led to legal decisions that are 
fundamentally flawed. 
Under California’s statutes, paternity revolves around three 
overlapping axes: a man’s legal or social relationship to the birth 
mother; his biological fatherhood through sexual relations with the 
 29. Section 7541(b) now allows a man who is a presumed father under section 7611 to 
prove that he, rather than the husband, is the child’s father. See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 
21 (Cal. 2004) (noting that the 1990 amendment to California Family Code section 7541 was 
intended to provide unwed biological fathers with the opportunity to establish paternity despite 
the conclusive presumption); Craig L. v. Sandy S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 607–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004) (holding that a biological father who was permitted by the mother and the mother’s 
husband to establish a relationship with his child qualified as a presumed father and therefore 
could initiate paternity proceedings). 
 30. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7571–77 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 31. California Family Code sections 7540 and 7541 retain the language of “blood” tests. 
Id. §§ 7540, 7541. However, California Family Code sections 7551–58 instead authorize 
“genetic” tests. Id. §§ 7551–58. The code sets a paternity index score of 100 or more as decisive 
for proof of parental connection. Id. § 7555. The number score of the paternity index is a 
“likelihood ratio,” showing how many times more likely it is that a union of the mother and 
putative father would produce an offspring with the child's observed genetic markers than 
would a union of the mother and a set of paired genes picked at random from men of the alleged 
father’s race. County of El Dorado v. Misura, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) 
(citing Plemel v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Or. 1987)); David H. Kaye, Plemel as a Primer 
on Proving Paternity, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 867, 877 (1988)). Robert’s paternity index 
score was 5300. Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at 4, Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 785 (2003) (No. 1-02-CP-010574). But see Ronald J. Richards, DNA Fingerprinting 
and Paternity Testing, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 613 (1989) (advocating that California 
allow DNA fingerprinting to prove paternity rather than relying on the current genetic marker 
tests method).  
 32. As Justice Kennard noted, “[t]he only California statute defining parental rights is the 
Uniform Parentage Act. . . . The UPA was never intended by the Legislature to govern the 
issues arising from new reproductive technologies such as gestational surrogacy.” Johnson v. 
Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 112 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). However, 
she also notes that “the UPA is on its face broadly applicable, and it is in any event the only 
statutory guidance this court has in resolving this case.” Id. The sole provision in the 1973 
Uniform Parentage Act dealing with ARTs is the section governing artificial insemination. 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001). 
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mother; or particular voluntary actions he takes (either executing a 
statutorily outlined voluntary declaration of paternity33 or “openly 
holding out the child” as his own).34 One complicated set of 
presumptions regarding paternity rests on a man’s marital or 
cohabiting relationship with the child’s mother.35 Other sections 
provide for biological testing to identify the man whose sexual 
relations with the mother led to the pregnancy.36 Voluntary 
acknowledgement of paternity will usually result from one of the 
other two foundations—either a social or a sexual connection to the 
mother.  
The California framework reveals that legal parenthood is a 
societal instrument rather than simply a confirmation of biological 
fact. Both adoption and marital presumptions of fatherhood 
sometimes place other factors ahead of biology. The marital 
presumption, which makes a husband the legal father of any children 
born to his wife during a marriage, was enacted when biological 
proof of paternity was hard to come by and the inference of a 
husband’s actual paternity seemed a reasonable one. Societal norms 
about property, patriarchy and morality also encouraged this 
assignment of paternity, as did the desire to supply both economic 
support and legitimacy to as many children as possible. In Michael H. 
v. Gerald D.,37 the United States Supreme Court upheld the marital 
presumption against constitutional challenge by the biological father, 
emphasizing the normative importance of the unitary family even in 
the face of genetic proof that another man was the child’s biological 
 33. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7571–77 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). The Code instructs 
hospitals and birth centers to try to get such a declaration and even offers them a monetary 
incentive for doing so. Id. § 7571 (c), (g). 
 34. Id. § 7611(d). 
 35. Id. §§ 7540–41, 7611. These code sections include attempts to marry or prior 
marriage. 
 36. Sexual relations are not explicitly mentioned in the statute, but at the time these 
provisions were enacted, blood or genetic tests to determine paternity necessarily required 
sexual contact except where artificial insemination, governed by California Family Code 
section 7613, had occurred. 
 37. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the 
conclusive presumption that where a mother’s husband affirms his role as the child’s father, he 
is the legal father of her child, even if the child was conceived with another man, and despite 
the other man having had an active and extended relationship with the child and having 
provided economic support). 
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father.38 Michael H. demonstrates that despite its declining statistical 
prevalence,39 the nuclear family continues to exert substantial legal 
influence. The California legislature somewhat reduced the effect of 
Michael H. by giving certain non-marital biological fathers a limited 
right to challenge a husband’s paternity,40 and case law has since held 
that the presumption must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.41 
Despite these adjustments, Michael H. retains powerful symbolic and 
practical impact. 
California’s marital presumption places paternity rights and 
obligations on many men who are their children’s biological fathers, 
but it has the effect of treating some men as fathers who are not the 
child’s biological progenitor. Statutory exceptions barring application 
of the presumption when a husband is sterile or impotent evidence 
the code’s ambivalence between reinforcing the nuclear family and 
protecting children on the one hand and assuring that the presumption 
rests on biological fact on the other. Husbands need not accept the 
rights and obligations of fatherhood if they doubt their biological 
connection. Husbands are on the short list of those empowered to 
challenge paternity when it is based on the marital presumption, 
albeit they must do so quickly.42 Two years after the child’s birth, this 
 38. Id. at 125–27. See generally Miller, supra note 28, at 645–49 (tracing the intertwined 
roles of conventional morality and probabilistic inference in supporting the martial 
presumption). 
 39. Between 1970 and 1995, the number of two-parent families remained relatively stable 
at approximately twenty-six million, but their proportion of all family groups with children 
declined from 87% to 69%. JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND 
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, at 7 (2004), http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-
553.pdf. Since 1996, the proportion of two-parent families has remained fairly level at about 
68%. Id. 
 40. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(b) (West Supp. 2005). 
 41. See Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Cal. 1998). 
As our discussions have indicated, the reasonableness of a statutory limitation on the 
right to offer proof of parentage depends on circumstances prevailing in each 
particular case. Accordingly, a court, before receiving evidence thereof, must in each 
instance make a preliminary determination, as by offer of proof, that due process 
concepts would be offended if the particular claimant to parentage were denied an 
opportunity to prove his claim.” 
Id. (quoting In Re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123, 133 n.17 (Cal. 1975)). 
 42. Others who can rebut the presumption include the presumed father, the child through 
or by his or her guardian ad litem, and the mother if the child’s biological father has filed an 
affidavit acknowledging paternity. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(b)-(c) (West Supp. 2005). The 
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limited opportunity for biology to trump marriage expires and 
societal interests once again take priority.43 
Paternity statutes recognize the importance of marriage and 
relationship status, but genetics has always been important to family 
ties, both in life and in law. The popularity of the cliché that blood is 
thicker than water speaks volumes about tradition and popular 
sentiment.44 In the years since California enacted the Uniform 
Parentage Act, genetics has, if anything, come to be seen as even 
more important. Half a century ago, both expert and lay 
understandings of child development emphasized the centrality of 
nurture over nature. Revulsion both about Nazi eugenics and about its 
milder forms practiced in the United States intensified the attachment 
to psycho-social theories of parenting.45 Today, however, the 
pendulum has swung quite substantially toward the nature end of the 
continuum. The sequencing of the human genome and other scientific 
advances now fuel a growing sense that genetics is crucial to who one 
is—medically, intellectually, and in terms of personality and 
temperament.46 If biological connection played so important a role 
presumption may only be rebutted for two years after the child’s birth. Id. Presumably, 
husbands challenge paternity when there is familial discord, or when it is more important to 
them to divest themselves of support obligations than to conform to conventional propriety. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Interesting examples of the common attitude are found in recent news reports about 
men who “discovered” through DNA tests that “their” children were not actually “theirs” and 
tried to walk away from parenthood and marriage as a result. See, e.g., Martin Kasindorf, Men 
Wage Battle on ‘Paternity Fraud,’ USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2002, at 3A; Richard Willing, DNA 
and Daddy, USA TODAY, July 29, 1999, at 1A. By contrast, once people have cared for a child, 
they often resist any notion that the child is not “theirs.” A particularly poignant example 
occurred in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, in which parents learned during pregnancy that one of the 
two embryos Ms. Fasano carried was not genetically “theirs.” Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 
N.Y.S.2d 19, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). The Fasanos were committed to this baby and only 
reluctantly surrendered the child to its genetic parents after obtaining an agreement that they 
could continue to see the child. Id. They went to court seeking visitation after the child’s 
parents abrogated the agreement as having been procured through duress. Id. at 22–23. 
 45. TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS xiv, 114 (2003). 
 46. Over the past decade and a half, the human genome has been mapped and the pace of 
discoveries about the role of genetics in development and disease has been dramatic. Because 
our current views about the decisiveness of genetics are rooted in this unusually rapid scientific 
advance, those attitudes may yet prove to have been overly exuberant. But it would be foolish 
to deny that the direction and magnitude of the cultural flow toward the nature end of the 
continuum will influence how we weigh parent-child relations today as compared to twenty 
years ago when William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead entered into the agreement that gave 
rise to the Baby M decision. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); see also supra notes 4–7 
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even in the more nurture-centric era when California adopted most of 
its parentage statutes, the continued emphasis on genetics today is not 
surprising. 
When no marital or quasi-marital presumption applies, the policy 
underlying paternity provisions is clear, although actual 
accomplishment of the goal may be considerably more difficult. 
Biology unquestionably dominates the quest to name a father. 
Although the legislature declared its desire to assure that every child 
has a father,47 the primary underlying purpose of such assurance is 
evident in the list of those entitled to bring paternity actions. When 
the woman who gave birth is not married to the father, she, a 
representative of the child, or, importantly, the Department of Child 
Support Services48 may initiate such action, usually in order to 
impose an economic support obligation.49 To be sure, men who father 
a child out of wedlock sometimes do affirmatively seek the status of 
legal father for reasons of genuine affection and interest in rearing 
their child or out of attachment to the child’s mother. But where a 
child’s parents were not married to each other, the focus is on 
determining which sexual partner’s sperm actually brought about 
conception so that he can be ordered to pay child support. 
Preoccupation with biological fatherhood, tempered mainly by 
reinforcement of legal marriage and acceptance of paternal 
volunteers, is not surprising in the statutes drafted to govern the 
consequences of coital reproduction. The scenarios that animate this 
statutory scheme, however, differ significantly from circumstances 
that prevail where parties use techniques of collaborative 
and accompanying text. 
 47. California Family Code section 7570 introduces the provisions for voluntary 
declaration of paternity, but its sweeping statements are neither limited to that route to 
establishing fatherhood, nor do they mince words about the underlying purposes of this 
legislative declaration of policy. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570 (West 2004). 
 48. Id. §§ 7630, 7634 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 49. In 2003, 1.5 million paternities were established, 1.2 million new child support orders 
were entered, and $21.2 billion in child support payments were collected. U.S. Dept. of Health 
& Human Serv., Office of Child Support Enforcement, Child Support Enforcement FY 2003 
Preliminary Data Report (2004), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2004/reports/ 
preliminary_data/. Preoccupation with economic support has even led the legislature to 
recognize written promises to pay child support even if those promises lack consideration and 
thus would otherwise be unenforceable under contract law. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7614 (West 
2004). 
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reproduction. Those differences ought not to be overlooked through 
rote application of statutes that are obsolete for these purposes.  
B. Differences Between Assisted Reproduction and Coital 
Procreation 
Assisted reproduction is different from coital reproduction. Those 
differences are magnified by other developments, both social and 
scientific. The most important differences stem from the relatively 
recent ability to separate various stages of reproduction. Promoting 
biological connection to progeny remains an important motivator for 
people’s procreative behavior, but assisted reproductive techniques 
rely precisely on their ability to replace a particular biological or 
genetic input, or to substitute a different collaborating person, in 
order to achieve a particular procreative goal. Assistive techniques 
can allow an infertile couple or an individual without a heterosexual 
partner to reproduce or, together with diagnostic genetics, can help to 
prevent the birth of a child with a genetic condition that derives from 
a parent’s status as a carrier. 
The new possibilities created by reproductive segmentation create 
new legal problems. For example, the traditionally easy task of 
determining biological motherhood can now be more problematic. In 
traditional coital conception, gestation and gametes were necessarily 
provided by the same woman, but because assistive techniques 
unbundle roles within the procreative process, they allow one woman 
to gestate and a different woman to contribute the ovum. Where two 
women are biologically significant in the formation of a child, value 
judgments about what should matter in legal motherhood are 
required.50 
Conversely, to the extent that a major and long-standing goal of 
paternity law has been to assess biological connections, the 
inferences and presumptions that have organized much of this field of 
law are far less necessary. With the advent of DNA testing, biological 
paternity can now be conclusively established or ruled out if potential 
candidates can be identified and tested. The complex statutory 
 50. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); Shultz, supra note 5, at 330–33. 
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presumptions about paternity now contribute mainly by way of 
expediting or reducing the cost of relatively routine proceedings. 
Segmentation in reproduction also allows the decoupling of sexual 
relations from procreation. Although reliable abortion and birth 
control are fairly new developments in human history, we have 
become accustomed to the fact that they allow motivated and 
financially capable individuals to engage in sexual relations with 
little or no risk of unwanted birth. Less familiar is the newer reality 
that assistive techniques make procreation possible through 
collaboration with individuals with whom one has had no sexual or 
intimate relationship. This unbundling of roles opens up a broader 
array of choices and family forms than previously existed. In 
particular, new technological and interpersonal means of achieving 
procreation make parenthood an option for more individuals in a 
wider range of intimate relationships, or in no relationship at all. 
These changes expand the range of biological and medical, as well as 
social and personal, choice. Because they are used by various 
categories of people (married couples, non-traditional aspirants to 
parenthood, diverse individuals who need reproductive assistance to 
achieve particular health or genetic outcomes), collaborative 
reproductive techniques enjoy wider societal acceptance than if they 
were linked to a single type of user.  
Other changes in society and values also affect the reproductive 
context. Increased numbers of births outside the bounds of marriage, 
the prevalence of divorce and of step- or blended families, and rising 
numbers of single-parent households have diluted the moral salience 
and statistical frequency of life-long marriage and the conventional 
nuclear family.51 These developments, too, contribute to today’s 
variety of family forms and foster tolerance for alternative 
arrangements. Even in this evolving context, both marriage and 
biology remain important human incentives and concerns, but they 
interact in less exclusive and more variegated ways with other kinds 
of plans and motivations. ARTs users and their relations with each 
other are more diverse and their motivations more varied than those 
that characterize coital procreation. 
 51. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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One other point should be noted. The scientific and social 
developments just described not only affect outcomes, they also 
shape the intellectual and emotional context. When assisted 
reproductive techniques are employed, people have made plans. 
People do not wander into fertility clinics for embryo implant, nor do 
they arrange agreements with collaborators outside their personal 
circle without having formed meaningful intentions and 
expectations.52 Although the distribution curves certainly overlap, 
intentions are typically more deliberate and central in ARTs than they 
are in coital reproduction. This is an important difference. When 
careful plans have been made, when hopes and expectations have 
been well developed and acted upon, when reliance has been 
incurred, it should matter. Biology and embodiment are vital, but 
intentions are also central to humanness.  
C. Paternity in Robert B. v. Susan B. 
Against this backdrop, I now turn to the facts and law of Robert v. 
Susan, and to what I characterize as the first significant legal issue–
whether DNA testing should have been ordered for Susan’s child, 
Daniel, in order to determine Robert’s biological paternity. In the 
early hearings regarding Robert’s demand for genetic testing, Judge 
Carr repeatedly emphasized her plan to take the process “step by 
step.”53 Although laudable in many circumstances, a step by step 
approach to a fact pattern quite different from those contemplated by 
the statutory template risks a failure of perspective. One of my 
favorite quotations about the law, both for its undeniable insight and 
for the wry distress it conveys, is attributed to a Harvard Professor, 
Thomas Reed Powell. Powell stated, “[i]f you have a mind that can 
 52. To be sure, people’s plans are never fully reasoned or articulated, but neither are they 
random or haphazard. For a discussion of bounded rationality, see generally Jon Elster, Where 
Rationality Fails, in THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 19 (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret Levi 
eds., 1990); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005). For a discussion of decision-making when not all relevant 
information is known, see generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). Lawyers can contribute to the development of 
ARTs by enhancing participants’ ability to anticipate issues that may arise. 
 53. “[W]hen all is said and done all we can do is take one step at a time.” Reporter’s 
Transcript on Appeal, supra note 1, at 44. 
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think about something that is inextricably connected with something 
else, without thinking about the something else, then you have The 
Legal Mind.”54 This kind of segmented thinking facilitates close 
analysis, but it also obstructs perception about things that fall outside 
of pre-determined categories.  
The trial judge ordered genetic testing under Family Code 
section 7551,55 which authorizes such testing upon request by a party 
to a paternity action.56 Where no marital presumption identifies the 
father, as here, section 7630 names those who may bring a paternity 
action, limiting the list to the child, the mother, a man presumed to be 
the father, an “interested party” seeking to establish a presumed 
father’s paternity, the Department of Child Support, and a man 
“alleged or alleging himself to be the father.”57 The principal purpose 
of section 7630 seems to be to allow those most motivated to do so to 
seek money from a man whose sexual relations with the mother make 
him a likely progenitor. It also reciprocally allows the same parties 
(again within two years of the child’s birth) to prove that a given man 
is not the biological father and thus does not owe support or have 
other rights. 
The trial judge allowed Robert to seek paternity under section 
7630(c) which includes among those with standing “a man alleged or 
alleging himself to be the father.”58 This is the only category in the 
parentage statutes under which Robert could conceivably have fit.59 It 
 54. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed 
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 563 (1991). 
 55. Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 56. California Family Code section 7551 provides for genetic testing. CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 7551 (West 2004). Section 7630 governs the filing of paternity actions. Id. § 7630 (West 2004 
& Supp. 2005). 
 57. Id. § 7630 (West Supp. 2005). Section 7630(c) only allows a man “alleging himself to 
be the father” to bring a paternity action when the child has no presumed father under section 
7611. Id. § 7630(c). Representatives of the identified parties may also act on the parties’ 
behalves. Id. 
 58. Id.; Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786. 
 59. “[T]his court believes [7630 (c)] is the only applicable section to this case . . . .” 
Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal, supra note 1, at 43. Robert was not a presumed father under 
section 7611. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). He had no past, present or 
attempted marital relationship with Susan. Id. § 7611(a)-(c). He did not know about Daniel until 
the child was ten months old; after he knew, Robert could not publicly hold Daniel out as his 
son because he could have no contact with Daniel until the court gave him access. Id. 
§ 7611(d). Robert was also not named as Daniel’s father by a voluntary declaration or on 
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is the same subsection that gives standing to the Department of Child 
Support to bring an action.60 It is also the subsection regarding which 
subsection (d) cross references section 7664,61 revealing that in 
addition to ordering child support, another ordinary use of this 
provision is to terminate a natural father’s paternal rights so that a 
child can be adopted or relinquished for adoption. The question is 
whether Robert should have been allowed to proceed under the only 
thinly connected odd lot collection of parties and purposes lumped 
together into section 7630(c).  
Before the advent of ARTs,62 there was no way that a man could 
win paternity under the statutory provisions unless the mother had 
had some consensual connection to him. That connection might have 
been as brief as a few minutes or as long as a long-established 
committed relationship, but a woman could not conceivably have had 
a man declared her child’s father without her having had some 
voluntary involvement with him.63 Where paternity was presumed 
because of past, present or attempted marriage, the mother had 
entered a social, legal and likely a sexual relationship with the man. If 
a man claimed paternity based on “holding out” the child as his own, 
the mother must have allowed him access to the child.64 If the man 
acquired paternity through a voluntary declaration at the time of 
birth, the mother must also have signed the document.65 If the man 
was “alleging” that he was the child’s father, he could not possibly 
have won parental status unless he had prior sexual relations with the 
Daniel’s birth certificate. Id. § 7571 (West 2004). 
 60. Id. § 7630(c) (West 2004 and Supp. 2005). 
 61. Id. § 7630(d); Id. § 7664. 
 62. This article discusses initial claims to parental rights. Adoption is a legally authorized 
transfer of parental rights that involves different factual and legal considerations. Here, unlike 
the Baby M case, supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text, the parties did not argue an analogy 
to adoption. 
 63. Voluntariness is a many-layered concept. It can connote minimal volition or can be 
defined in light of complex and sophisticated notions of free will, social, economic or cultural 
coercion, etc. A more robust notion of voluntariness is a contested matter, as illustrated by 
Catharine MacKinnon’s view of marital sex. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A 
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). The many facets and nuances of choice are important. 
However, in this context, I use the simpler meaning of the word because the court’s indifference 
to the absence of even that simple level of choice by Susan is shocking to me. 
 64. This is, of course, unless the child was kidnapped, a situation which, like rape, see 
infra note 66 and accompanying text, involves criminal behavior distinct from the facts here. 
 65. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7574(b)(1) (West 2004). 
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mother, which, barring rape,66 meant that there was at least one 
instance of consensual sex.67  
Under ARTs techniques, however, gametes, embryos and 
gestational services are acquired through contract. Those contracts 
frequently involve persons who have no marital, sexual or socially 
intimate contact with the other contracting party (or parties). Using 
such techniques, individuals can procreate with the intent to be a 
legal parent and to rear the child that is created without there having 
been any of the above-described relationships—not marital or quasi-
marital, not voluntary affiliation, not intimate or sexual. Assisted 
reproductive techniques do rest on a consensual link, but that link is 
typically an impersonal contractual agreement either directly between 
the procreative collaborators, or indirectly through a professional 
intermediary.  
This possibility of procreative collaborators who have no marital, 
sexual or social connection other than a contract was, for the most 
part, not envisioned at the time the statutes presently governing 
paternity and “blood” or “genetic” tests were enacted. The first, and 
so far only, statutory exception reflected in California law was 
adopted to sort out the legal consequences of artificial insemination 
(“AI”), the only assistive technique widely used when the 1973 
Uniform Parentage Act was promulgated.68 The very name 
“artificial” underscores the lack of personal contact between the 
 66. Women do become pregnant via rape, but quite different policy considerations should 
govern such situations. See Id. § 7611.5 (West 2004) (proscribing the application of the 
presumption of paternity where a child is conceived as a result of rape). But see In re Jesusa V., 
85 P.3d 2, 61 (Cal. 2004) (Chin, J., dissenting) (noting that section 7611.5 prohibits “rapists 
from becoming presumed fathers only if they do not qualify under § 7611 . . . but father[s] [who 
are rapists are presumptively] unfit to have custody or control”). During oral argument a 
member of the Sixth District panel asked whether Susan’s situation was analogous to rape. In 
both situations, there is lack of consent to the adults’ connection. However, there is no 
culpability in Susan’s situation, making this quite distinct from rape. See infra note 76 and 
accompanying text. 
 67. Theoretically, the child or child’s representative could initiate an action to name a 
father, but as a practical matter, children do not bring such actions when they are very young or 
newborn. Provisions allowing representatives of various persons with standing to bring an 
action create a theoretical possibility of a father being named (“alleged”) without the child’s 
mother having acquiesced. It is unlikely, however, that such an action could succeed unless the 
biological connection was established or unless the mother consented. 
 68. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2004). Not until 1978 was the first child born 
through in vitro fertilization, the second ART procedure developed. See infra note 166. 
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parties that is a hallmark of the procedure. Legislatures accepted the 
social need for such a procedure and enacted statutes to govern 
parental status after AI. These AI laws embraced the technique when 
carried out under the auspices of a licensed physician.69 They 
separated parenthood from biology or marriage and protected the 
integrity of the new family unit from outside intrusion. I will discuss 
these AI provisions in more detail in Part IV. 
Aside from its AI provision, the California paternity statutes were 
enacted when both medical techniques and social arrangements of 
reproduction in fact required some form of consensual relationship 
with the child’s mother before a man could be declared a child’s legal 
father. There was no need to explicitly state this requirement because 
no other possibility existed. But in Susan’s case, there was no such 
consensual relationship—no marriage, no cohabitation, no sexual 
relations, no voluntary access to her child that resulted in Robert 
“holding out” the child as his own, no naming on a birth certificate, 
and no signing of a voluntary declaration of paternity.70 Yet, taken 
literally and in isolation, the sections of the paternity statutes could 
seem to include Robert because he “alleges” that he is Daniel’s 
father. This allegation stemmed from the doctor’s belated admission 
of a mistake nearly nineteen months after it occurred and more than 
ten months after Daniel’s birth, during which time Susan was the 
only family Daniel had ever known. Until that moment, there had 
been no question about Susan’s sole parenthood and the integrity of 
her family unit. Despite the absence of any consent, volition or 
acquiescence by Susan, the literal language of section 7630(c) seems 
to allow Robert to bring a paternity action. In turn, if Robert could 
bring an action under section 7630(c), he could also seek an order for 
genetic tests under section 7551. 
The trial judge’s insistence on taking this case “step by step”71 and 
on applying the statutes’ literal and plain meaning72 was reinforced 
by the Court of Appeal.73 
 69. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001). 
 70. There was also no contract between Robert and Susan to engage in collaborative 
reproduction.  
 71. See supra note 53. 
 72. “[W]hat this court has decided to do is to apply a literal interpretation of both code 
sections.” Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal, supra note 1, at 43. 
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 We need not go beyond the language of section 7613(b) to 
resolve Susan’s claim. . . . As the trial court recognized, the 
plain meaning of the statutory language does not permit the 
application Susan urges. . . . 
 Because the language of section 7613(b) is clear, we will 
not engage in statutory construction to determine the intended 
purpose and scope of this provision. Susan’s appeal to the 
“clear social policy supporting single parenthood” would more 
appropriately be directed to the Legislature.74 
There is nothing remarkable about these observations by the two 
courts. Indeed, the legislature should act. Absent such action, the 
words of the statutes, read literally, seem to allow the paternity action 
and the genetic testing ordered by the trial court and upheld by the 
appellate courts. Nor do the statutes make any explicit provision for 
the kind of mistake that occurred here. But at the time the basic 
statutory architecture was adopted from the 1973 Uniform Parentage 
Act, there was, quite literally, no possibility for someone in Robert’s 
shoes to fit within the categories of those allowed to seek paternity. 
Because it was impossible for such a person to emerge, there was no 
perceived need for the statutes to rule him out. Such a situation was 
literally unthinkable.75 But the courts’ nose to the ground approach in 
2003 prevented them from seeing that it was their literal application 
of obsolete statutes to an ARTs reality that produced a radical 
departure from legal experience. 
Would California law allow a man who was an absolute stranger 
to the mother to file for paternity and to impose DNA testing on her 
 73. Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 74. Id. (citation omitted). 
 75. The only “thinkable” instance of such a non-consensual claimant to fatherhood would 
arise from the sole ARTs part of parentage statutes, the section governing AI. If there were a 
mix-up in sperm used for AI, a situation akin to Susan’s case could have arisen. If the man 
whose sperm was mistakenly used was an anonymous donor, he would be unlikely and unable 
to assert paternity under the AI statute. Possibly the woman inseminated would have a 
malpractice action against the professional intermediary if donor sperm other than that she had 
selected had been used, but she would not likely pursue a paternity action. If the man whose 
sperm was mistakenly used was not a donor, and provided sperm only for insemination of an 
identified partner, then the situation would be analytically similar to Susan’s case, and would 
raise analogous issues. A variant might be that the gestator might have also been the genetic 
mother. Thanks to Professor Susan Appleton for pointing out this issue. 
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child? It is hard to imagine that a court would have so ordered if the 
mother conclusively proved the lack of any consensual contact with 
that man.76 It is even harder to imagine that a court would have 
ordered child support to be paid by a man who reluctantly found 
himself in Robert’s shoes after this kind of mistake. The 
unimaginable nature of these outcomes underscores the wrongness of 
the outcome here. 
A statutory scheme constructed to take better account of ARTs77 
might not have ordered such genetic testing. The latest revisions of 
the Uniform Parentage Act suggest as much. This version of the UPA 
has only been in existence for a short time. So far, only a few states 
have adopted it; California is not one of them.78 Although the new 
version’s text does not directly speak to the issues in Susan’s case, it 
nevertheless offers useful guidance for the resolution of such issues. 
Articles 7 and 8 of the revised Uniform Parentage Act wrestle with 
problems of parentage in ARTs disputes.79 Because Susan and Robert 
had no gestational agreement, Article 8 would not apply. The 
provisions of Article 7 largely parallel those of the original Uniform 
Parentage Act governing artificial insemination by donor (“AID”)80 
except that the revised provisions expand and clarify the rules under 
which “intending” parties, and not those who agree to be “donors,” 
become the legal parents of children created through various types of 
assisted reproductive arrangements.81 Because they had separate and 
conflicting intentions and because neither met the statutory definition 
of a donor, Susan and Robert’s situation would not be resolved by the 
new Article 7 either. The much expanded Article 5 governing genetic 
testing, however, would dictate a different resolution than the 
 76. A rapist does not receive parental rights even if he is the genetic father. CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 7611.5 (West 2004). 
 77. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 5 (Supp. 
2005) (noting the “incredible scientific advances in parentage testing since 1973” and the need 
to clarify parentage for children born through ARTs). 
 78. Four states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, as amended in 2002. For a list of 
adopting states, see supra note 8. 
 79. See supra note 11. 
 80. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701–07 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 354–59 (Supp. 
2005).  
 81. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (Supp. 2005). 
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California courts reached in Susan’s case.82 Unlike the 1973 Uniform 
Parentage Act’s predecessor provision on blood testing, Article 5 of 
the most recent amended version would not have allowed the court to 
order testing in Susan’s case. Section 502 provides in relevant part 
that 
the court shall order the child and other designated individuals 
to submit to genetic testing if the request for testing is 
supported by the sworn statement of a party to the proceeding: 
(1) alleging paternity and stating facts establishing a 
reasonable probability of the requisite sexual contact between 
the individuals . . . .83 
California updated its original UPA-based testing provisions in 
1997, but mainly for purposes of changing the name from “blood” to 
“genetic” testing.84 At this time, the above-mentioned UPA 
requirement of a sworn statement alleging sexual contact had not yet 
been promulgated. Under the existing statute, Robert could use his 
status as a party to the paternity action to insist on genetic testing by 
simply filing a declaration about the doctor’s belated confession of 
error and “alleging himself” to be Daniel’s father.85 Nothing more 
was required for him to turn Susan’s life upside down.86  
Although the new UPA does not explicitly contemplate the kind 
of mistake that occurred in Susan’s case, the commissioners’ 
 82. There was only one section in the 1973 UPA discussing biological testing. UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 11 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 445 (2001). However, there were eleven sections in 
the amended version. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 501–511, 9B U.L.A. 329–37 (2001). 
 83. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 502(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 329 (2001) (emphasis 
added). 
 84. California Family Code section 7551 provides for genetic testing. CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 7551 (West 2004). The word “blood” was replaced with “genetic” in 1997. Id. at amends. 
 85. The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act and California’s 1997 revisions required nothing 
more than status as a party in an action where paternity was an issue to allow the court to order 
biological testing. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 11 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 445 (2001); CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 7551 (West 2004). Current statutory sections that authorize orders for biological testing 
require a “declaration under oath submitted by the moving party stating the factual basis for 
placing the issue of paternity before the court.” See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(d) (West 
2004) (emphasis added). 
 86. See Chiang, supra note 21 (noting that Susan “called the custody fight an ‘on-going 
nightmare’”); Mary Anne Ostrom, Mom Speaks Out on Embryos Mix-Up, Campbell Woman in 
Legal Nightmare After S.F. Lab Error, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 3, 2004, at 1A 
(“[Susan’s] days are filled with nightmarish fears that she still could lose her son.”). 
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familiarity with modern techniques of assisted reproduction and their 
effort to grapple with the legal consequences of such disputes may 
have caused them to add the requirement of a sworn statement of 
sexual relations as a predicate for court-ordered genetic testing.87 Had 
such a requirement been in place in California, Robert could not, of 
course, have made such a declaration. He also could not have asked 
the court to order genetic testing under any other provision. Without 
genetic tests, Robert’s allegation of paternity would likely have been 
insufficiently supported to have allowed him to be designated as the 
Daniel’s legal father. 
The courts’ literal application of the paternity statutes makes their 
treatment of Susan’s case utterly indistinguishable from situations 
where a child had been born as a result of a one night stand or a long 
term non-marital relationship. However, the only similarities between 
the dispute here and disputes between such unwed progenitors are 
that each party has a biological connection to the child at issue and 
that there is an intense conflict between them. The statutes and the 
analogies drawn from them are inappropriate because they ignore the 
many differences between these situations—differences in the 
procreative method, in factual and legal expectations and intentions, 
in the presence or absence of consensual relationship, and even in the 
causal source of the current predicament. These differences, and the 
legislature’s and courts’ failure to recognize them, are part of the 
reason that the “resolution” here is not a solution. The courts imposed 
a long-term family relationship on total strangers, and created a high 
probability of continuing conflict in Daniel’s life for years to come. 
The outcome suggests a lack of empathy from the judges and 
dramatizes how the statutory template assumes and addresses a 
radically different reality than the one that brought these parties into 
court. 
 87. Alternatively, the commissioners may not have recognized that Articles 7 and 8 might 
not resolve some ARTs disputes, and that in such instances, genetic testing issues might arise 
under Article 5. As Susan’s counsel, we did not raise the Article 5 argument under the 2002 
Uniform Parentage Act amendments. Because no part of the proposed law had been enacted in 
California and because of the narrow statutory inclinations of the judges, we feared that such an 
argument would waste space and time in an already multi-issue case. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF MARITAL STATUS 
Marc Gradstein, my co-counsel in Susan’s case, commented on 
the first day he met with Susan that if there were any possible way to 
do so, she should marry someone, anyone, quickly. Although the 
observation was mainly ironic, Marc foresaw that Susan’s having 
been, or perhaps arranging to become, married would be the most 
likely route to keeping Daniel. His advice turned out to be prescient. 
It is less clear that the law should reward status or create such an 
incentive.  
A. The Marital Presumption 
Had Susan been married when this reproductive mistake occurred, 
she would have been able to block Robert’s claim to paternity from 
the outset.88 California’s “conclusive” marital presumption directs 
that the husband of a woman who gives birth is the legal father of any 
child born during the marriage.89 The irony in Marc’s advice, of 
course, was that Susan could not retrospectively “be married.” But 
the legislature’s concern with marital status also spawned other 
(rebuttable) marriage-related presumptions. By marrying after 
Daniel’s birth, Susan might have been able to cobble together a 
presumption of paternity under Family Code section 7611(c), which 
would have prevented Robert’s paternity action under section 
7630(c). Reasonably enough, Susan did not and therefore could not. 
In Susan’s case, Robert emphasized that the conclusive 
presumption applied only in a marital family unit, and was therefore 
unavailable to Susan who was single.90 But Michael H.’s holding that 
a genetic father could be denied paternity and even visitation with his 
child could perhaps have provided some comfort to Susan. In 
Michael H., the biological father’s exclusion from the child’s life was 
 88. Robert’s briefs virtually conceded this and made a point of distinguishing her 
unmarried status as a radically different circumstance. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 
20, at 16, 19–20, 22–23, 37, 39. 
 89. See supra note 28. The presumption was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1989 
against constitutional attack by a non-marital biological father. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110 (1989). 
 90. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 20, at 23–24. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 77 Shultz book pages.doc  5/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 19:77 
 
 
 
upheld despite his having lived with the child and her mother for a 
period of time, his having provided partial financial support for the 
child, and his having had a positive relationship of several years 
duration with the child.91 He, and indeed all four individuals 
involved, openly acknowledged that he was the child’s biological 
father. His was, therefore, a far stronger connection than any Robert 
could claim.92  
Despite the support that Michael H. might have offered to Susan’s 
position, we did not argue the case, partly because the marital status 
issue that cut against us was so central to the Supreme Court’s 
decision, and partly because of the complex and varied way that 
several subsequent California cases have treated Michael H. In Brian 
C. v. Ginger K.,93 Judge Sills concluded that Michael H. “has almost 
no application beyond its peculiar facts, if only because the holding 
of Justice Scalia’s lead plurality opinion was expressly repudiated by 
a majority of five of the court’s justices.”94 In Dawn D. v. Superior 
Court of Riverside County,95 the California Supreme Court observed 
that at least seven of the nine justices in Michael H. rejected the 
assertion that a biological link alone was a sufficient basis to trigger 
due process protection for a non-marital genetic father.96 In seeking 
review of Susan’s case by the California appellate court, we judged 
that arguing these cases would create more problems than benefits. 
Like many strategic decisions in a complex case, whether our 
 91. Supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 92. Robert argued that he was comparatively better situated than Michael to make such a 
claim because, according to Robert, five justices in Michael H.. agreed that the biological 
father’s plea had fallen short because his commitment to parenthood had not been sufficiently 
established. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 20, at 19–20. This assertion misreads the 
alleged fifth justice, Justice Stevens’, opinion, which says only that Michael might have been 
granted visitation as an “interested person” rather than as a father. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 133–
34, 136 (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding Michael’s due process rights were therefore 
satisfied). Justice Stevens says nothing suggesting that Michael’s commitment to the child was 
insufficient. 
 93. Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 94. Id. at 304. In his opinion, Judge Sills details the assorted conflicts and incongruities of 
the five opinions in Michael H., putting a distinctive California slant on the much debated 
decision. 
 95. Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1998). 
 96. Id. at 1144–45 (holding that a biological father had no rights to paternity because he 
did not have an existing personal relationship with his child born to a woman that was married 
to another man). 
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judgment was correct is impossible to determine. After Michael H. 
was decided, the California legislature amended the statute to 
somewhat weaken the marital presumption.97 Although the change 
did not help Robert because he was not a presumed father under 
Family Code section 7611, it was of no help to Susan either.  
B. A Normative Preference for Two Parent Families? 
The rule that marriage should conclusively and uniquely protect a 
family unit from intrusion by an outside claimant to parenthood has a 
number of possible justifications. The marital presumption expresses 
the state’s historical normative preference for marriage as the socially 
sanctioned context for both adult-adult and parent-child intimacy.98 
But family configurations have been changing. Conventional family 
morality viewed marriage and parenthood as inextricably interwoven; 
neither was desirable without the other. Today, this merger of roles 
and tasks is far less dominant.99 There are many marriages that 
 97. See supra note 61. 
 98. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–20 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality 
opinion) (suggesting that California’s marital presumption is the implementation of a 
substantive rule of law). Justice Scalia notes: 
The conclusive presumption is actually a substantive rule of law based upon a 
determination by the Legislature as a matter of overriding social policy, that given a 
certain relationship between the husband and wife, the husband is to be held 
responsible for the child, and that the integrity of the family unit should not be 
impugned. 
Id. (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)). Justice 
Scalia continues, “[o]f course the conclusive presumption not only expresses the State's 
substantive policy but also furthers it, excluding inquiries into the child’s paternity that would 
be destructive of family integrity and privacy.” Michael H., 491 U.S. at 120. 
 99. For theoretical and policy-based discussions of parenthood, see generally Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); Shultz, supra note 5, at 337–46. 
For statistical information, see infra note 100. Marriage and child-rearing are even less tightly 
linked in some American subcultures. See FIELDS, supra note 39, at 9 (noting that black single-
mothers are more likely to never be married than non-Hispanic White or Hispanic single-
mothers). African-American mothers face special issues regarding marriage because America’s 
racial inequality effectively removes many black males from the marriage market. For example, 
African-American males have a shorter life expectancy than whites or than African-American 
females. See generally MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A 
COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (2003). They also have higher rates of unemployment, lower income 
levels, and higher rates of imprisonment. Id. 
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remain “child-free,” some by design and others by fate.100 
Conversely, there are many parent-child relationships that function 
outside the context of marriage for all or part of a child’s minority. 
Some marital families place parenting responsibilities almost 
exclusively in one of the two adults. Non-marital parents are 
sometimes single parents and sometimes combine child-rearing roles 
with another or several other adults. Blended and step-families 
include some characteristics of both dual parent and single parent 
family units. 
Family law has adapted in various ways to equalize the treatment 
of children born within and outside a marriage,101 and to more fully 
accept the greater variety of family and parenting arrangements,102 
 100. See FIELDS, supra note 39, at 16. Married couples without children represented 28.2% 
of all households in 2003. Id. at 4. 33% of all births in 2002 were to unmarried women. 
BARBARA DOWNS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 2002, at 5 
(2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-548.pdf. Single-mother families increased 
from three million in 1970 to ten million in 2003; single-father families grew from less than 
half a million to two million in the same time period. FIELDS, supra note 39, at 7. Of married 
mothers, six of the seven million mothers who were out of the labor force throughout 2003 said 
that the primary reason was to care for the home and family. Id. at 11–12. Note also that in 
2003, 4.6 million households were classified as unmarried partner households, of which 41% 
included children under the age of eighteen. Id. at 16–17; see also Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing 
Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 21–23 (1995) (estimating that 60% of children 
will spend some time in a single-parent family before reaching the age of eighteen). 
 101. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (distinguishing between legitimate and 
illegitimate children constitutes invidious discrimination for purposes of wrongful death 
recovery after the death of a parent); see infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Uniform Parentage Act’s goal of eliminating such recovery). 
 102. For a discussion of second-parent lesbian adoption cases, see infra notes 113–15 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion of grandparents’ rights, compare Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977) (preventing the state from “forcing all to live in certain 
narrowly defined family patterns” and noting especially that the tradition of grandparents 
raising children deserves constitutional recognition), with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 
(2000) (denying visitation to grandparents where granting visitation would result in 
unconstitutional infringement on parents’ fundamental right to rear children). For a recognition 
of de facto and psychological parents, see Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1983) (awarding guardianship custody to a couple who developed a de facto parent-
child relationship with child despite the genetic parents’ opposition). For a discussion of 
stepparent adoption without termination of same sex parents’ rights, see In re M.M.D. & 
B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995) (holding that the “stepparent exception” prevented the 
termination of the adoptive parent-child relationship when the same sex partner subsequently 
adopted the child). For a discussion regarding the elimination of distinctions based on the 
marital status of a child’s parents, see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993) 
(noting that the parent-child relationship depends on that relationship alone, not on the marital 
status of the child’s parents). 
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including marriages that are shorter and more contingent.103 Hard and 
fast rules either preferring marriage over all other family forms or 
insisting that a particular pattern of parenthood is always better for a 
child would be difficult to defend with concrete evidence, as opposed 
to predilection.104 Given the many changes in family configurations, 
arguments based on social context or stigma that might traditionally 
have distinguished between marital and single parent families now 
seem comparatively weak. This is especially so if one believes, as I 
do, that the critical component of parenting is the quality of the 
parent(s) rather than their number, gender, or marital status. 
Nevertheless, many people remain convinced that two parents are 
always better than one (at least when they are of different genders).105 
The proposition that, all other things being equal, it is better for a 
child to have two sources of economic and emotional support is 
unremarkable.106 The thorny issue is whether in any given instance, 
 103. In 1969, California enacted Civil Code section 4506 regarding “no fault divorce.” 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 2004)). The U.S. 
divorce rate, as reported in 2003, was 3.8 per 1000 of the total population, while the marriage 
rate was 7.5 per 1000. Thus there were about half as many divorces as marriages in any given 
year. See National Center for Health Statistics, Fast Stats A-Z: Marriage and Divorce, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2005). The U.S. Census 
Bureau reports that 50% of first marriages for men under age forty-five may end in divorce; 
between 45% and 52% of first marriages for women of the same age group may end in divorce. 
ROSE M. KREIDER & JASON M. FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NUMBER, TIMING, AND 
DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996, at 18 (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2002pubs/p70-80.pdf. 
 104. See Bartlett, supra note 99, at 294 (exploring non-marital parenthood and advocating 
that the law focus on responsibility and relationship in parenting). 
 105. Many states object to a child having two parents when they are of the same sex. See, 
e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2004) (specifically barring adoption by gay couples and a 
fortiori prohibiting a same-sex partner from adopting the biological child of a partner); In re 
Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072–73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a lesbian 
partner may not adopt her partner’s biological child without termination of the mother’s 
parental rights). Some states have accepted parenting by gays, including allowing a same-sex 
partner to adopt the biological parent’s child. See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 
554, 568–70 (Cal. 2003) (holding that thousands of same-sex second parent adoptions in 
California are permissible despite arguments that Family Code section 8617 might imply 
otherwise and that the statute regarding termination of parental rights prior to adoption can be 
waived). 
 106. If the point is “more is better,” it is interesting that there is near-complete resistance to 
a child having more than two legal parents. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 
118 (1989) (“California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.”); 
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (rejecting the idea that the child had two 
mothers, stating that “for any child California law recognizes only one natural mother, despite 
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all other things are equal. The differences between ARTs and coital 
conception have important bearing on that question. 
C. Assisted Reproduction, Single Parent Families, and Parentage 
Law 
The California legislature has enacted only one code section that 
on its face addresses ARTs parentage. That section, Family Code 
section 7613, governs artificial insemination and also has 
implications for marital status.107 Tracking the 1973 UPA, the 
California code provides incentives for AI users to proceed under the 
auspices of a state-licensed physician-intermediary.108 The UPA 
arranged rights and responsibilities of legal parenthood in ways likely 
to be favored by traditional users, i.e., marital couples in which the 
husband is infertile.109 California’s AI statute provides that in this 
situation, legal paternity will not follow biology.110 If the husband of 
a married woman consents to her insemination as carried out by a 
licensed physician, the husband becomes the legal father of any 
resultant child, even though the sperm donor is the source of the 
biological gamete.111 California also enacted the recommended 
companion provision providing that a sperm donor would not be the 
child’s legal father, but it made one important change. The legislature 
dropped the word “married” from the language of the 1973 UPA, 
stating that when a licensed physician performs AI on “a woman,” 
the sperm donor will not be the legal father of any child so 
conceived.112 This second segment of California’s law not only 
advances in reproductive technology rendering a different outcome biologically possible”). But 
see Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 568–70 (holding that the California Code relieves birth parents of 
parental duties after termination, but that the statute may be waived to allow a same-sex parent 
to adopt the partner’s child); Shultz, supra note 5, at 330–33, 344–45. 
 107. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2004). 
 108. Id. § 7613(a). 
 109. The Uniform Parentage Act (1973) limited nonparenthood of a donor to situations in 
which the donor provided sperm for assisted reproduction by a married woman. UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001). 
 110. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 2004) (“If . . . a wife is inseminated artificially with 
semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural 
father of a child thereby conceived.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. § 7613(b). 
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separates paternity from biology, it also separates parental status from 
marital status. 
Various California appellate courts have addressed the desirability 
of single, as compared to two-parent, families, including one case 
decided under the AI statute. In Jhordan C. v. Mary K.,113 the court 
construed section 7613(b) in a dispute between a lesbian couple and a 
sperm donor.114 In the court’s view, the legislature omitted the word 
“married” from section 7613(b) because it intended to allow single 
women to create statutorily protected families through AI.115 
In another dispute involving a girlfriend’s use of a decedent’s 
sperm to conceive a child, the court rejected the argument that the 
Family Code "demonstrates the state's recognition that a child is 
better off with two living parents, whether living apart or living 
together, rather than with just one parent.”116 The court stated that the 
“parties fail[ed] to cite any pertinent authority which indicate[d] that 
the state ha[d] a policy of preventing the formation of single-parent 
families.”117 
Finally, in Kelsey S.,118 a case concerning a contested adoption 
rather than ARTs parentage, the California Supreme Court discussed 
the increasing incidence and acceptance of single parent families and 
observed with approval that “New York’s high court also recently 
rejected the argument that the state has a sufficiently strong interest 
in providing two-parent families to discriminate against unwed 
fathers.”119 
 113. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 114. Id. at 531–32. The Court of Appeal of California construed CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 7005(b), now codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b).  
 115. Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 534, 537 (holding that the removal of the word 
“married” from (now) 7613(b) created a statutory right for unmarried as well as married women 
to bear children without fear of the sperm donor’s claim to paternity). In Jhordan C., the donor 
received parental rights because the insemination failed to conform to statutory requirements. 
Id. at 537–38. 
 116. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 286 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 117. Id. The parties cited California Family Code section 4600(a), now section 3020, for 
this point. Id. 
 118. Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816 (Cal. 1992). 
 119. Id. at 845. The Court continued, “[n]or can we merely assume, either as a policy or 
factual matter, that [two-parent] adoption is necessarily in a child’s best interest. This 
assumption is especially untenable in light of the rapidly changing concept of family.” Id. The 
Kelsey court then pointed out that single people now adopt children, and noted “that New 
York's high court also recently rejected the argument that the state has a sufficiently strong 
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These comments regarding the state’s openness to single parent 
families are, of course, not dispositive either of the issue in general or 
in Susan’s case. Although stated in rather sweeping terms, these 
judicial remarks are necessarily embedded in particular 
circumstances which bear greater or lesser resemblance to the facts of 
Robert v. Susan. In addition, at least one legislative pronouncement 
on the subject seems to cut the other way. In Family Code section 
7570(a), the California legislature declared its finding that “[t]here is 
a compelling state interest in establishing paternity for all 
children.”120 Section 7570 stresses that the concern derives from the 
view that determining paternity “is the first step toward a child 
support award.”121 Because economic viability is a major problem for 
many single mothers,122 this legislative pronouncement may have 
been spurred not solely by concern for children but also by the need 
to protect public funds. These overlapping financial concerns are 
likely stronger motives than abstract views of optimal family 
configuration.123 A policy that rests on moral, empirical, or child 
development bases might be deemed a one-size-fits-all mandate, at 
least by way of aspiration. If it rests instead on generalizations about 
economics, such a policy might appropriately be applied in a more 
tailored fashion.  
interest in providing two-parent families to discriminate against unwed fathers.” Id. (citing In re 
Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 427 (N.Y. 1990)). 
 120. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570(a) (West 2004). 
 121. Id. 
 122. FIELDS, supra note 39, at 9 (noting that of the twelve million one-parent family 
groups, ten million are maintained by women and that single-parent families maintained by 
women are more likely than single-parent families maintained by men to have incomes below 
poverty level); see also Dowd, supra note 100, at 23. (“Most single-parent families with 
children are headed by women and a majority of female-headed families (fifty-three percent) 
are poor.”) (footnote omitted). 
 123. The declaration and subsequent provisions derive from federal requirements that states 
be proactive in identifying fathers when the child is first born. For instance, Title IV-D of the 
Social Security Act requires states to establish child support enforcement programs. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 651, 666 (2005). Additionally, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) provides for child support enforcement to ensure that 
families receiving federal public benefits meet obligations. Pub. L. No. 104-190, 110 Stat. 2105 
(1996). For further discussion of these requirements, see Alameda County Dep’t of Child 
Support Serv., New Legislation: Government Roles and Responsibilities in the Child Support 
Process, http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/css/legislations.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2005). 
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If the justification for a two-parent preference is economic, ARTs 
again diverge from traditional reproduction. On average, single-
parent families arising from use of assisted reproduction likely have a 
somewhat different economic profile than single-parent families 
arising from divorce or decisions not to marry despite coital 
reproduction. Both because ARTs themselves are expensive124 and 
because intentions play a much more central role in assisted 
reproduction, women who avail themselves of ARTs to create a 
single parent family are less likely to be economically marginal than 
are other single parents. For example, in Susan’s case, money was not 
a problem until a second parent was imposed on her by the courts. 
Susan owned her home and had a stable, well-paying job until the 
continuing litigation over Daniel’s parentage forced her to give up 
her job and mortgage her house to pay the escalating legal costs.125 
Contrary to the standard rationale, in Susan’s case it was the 
insistence on two parents that created an economic burden, rather 
than the other way around.126  
Intentionality also distinguishes ARTs parenthood disputes from 
those that occur after traditional procreation. Coital reproduction 
takes place along a continuum from decidedly unintentional to very 
purposeful. But people who use ARTs must often arrange for 
biological assistance from those outside their intimate personal circle 
(either from a professional or from a reproductive collaborator, or 
both), and those arrangements require a comparatively high level of 
intentionality. Typically, agreements between the collaborators, as 
 124. See infra note 135. 
 125. See supra note 22. 
 126. The economic burden on Susan has been further increased by the fact that as of 
February 2005, Robert had still paid no child support to Susan. In November 2004, more than a 
year after Robert was designated Daniel’s legal father, Susan filed a restitution action against 
Robert. She claimed that Robert had been unjustly enriched in that he now enjoyed the 
companionship and the right to joint legal custody of Daniel, but that she had undergone the 
medical and financial burdens of pregnancy without any assistance from him. In response 
Robert filed a Special Motion to Strike Susan’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP code, CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2004), claiming that her restitution action was an effort 
to chill exercise of his right to petition the court for parental status. Remarkably enough, the 
court granted Robert’s motion on April 20, 2005, ordering Susan to pay costs and Robert’s 
attorney’s fees. Robert B. v. Susan B., No. 1-04-CV-030291 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2005) 
(order signed by Judge William F. Martin). Although she felt the decision was wrong, Susan 
also felt she could not afford to appeal the order. 
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well as contracts between ARTs users and the professional 
intermediaries they hire, express the parties’ reciprocal and/or 
compatible intentions and provide for their attainment. Both Susan on 
the one hand, and Robert and Denise on the other, had reproductive 
intentions and expectations. Both had purchased biological 
components from donors and both had retained the services of 
fertility professionals. However, these three individuals had 
absolutely no joint or reciprocal intentions with each other.127 
Rather, an error by the professionals whose services they had 
separately retained actually destroyed any possibility of fully 
realizing their independent original intentions. That error 
unexpectedly thrust these parties together in ways that made at least 
some of their original expectations incompatible and unattainable.  
Even though their original intentions were incompatible, 
examining the separate intentions of each party will assist further 
analysis. After reflecting about her options and rejecting adoption 
because she feared the possibility of biological parents changing their 
minds, Susan decided IVF offered her the best chance to have a child. 
Like many who turn to assisted reproductive techniques, she arranged 
to purchase gametes, planning to have the embryos resulting from 
IVF transferred to her womb so that she could gestate her own child, 
even though she would not be its genetic mother.128 Because section 
7613(b) was the legal provision that best approximated her ARTs 
method and intentions, Susan believed that adherence to the 
requirements of that statute would protect the parent-child family unit 
she hoped to create against paternity claims by a sperm donor. 
Although Susan acted in scrupulous accord with the statute that 
should have protected her from competing parentage claims, the 
situation as it actually transpired did not fit neatly into the California 
AI statute. Susan planned a single parent family with a child born of 
in vitro and embryo transfer using donor gametes, but her embryos 
were not the ones transferred; instead, Robert and Denise’s embryos 
were implanted in Susan by mistake. Robert did not intend to donate 
 127. For this reason, neither Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), nor my proposal 
in Shultz, supra note 5, will resolve this problem.  
 128. This and the remaining facts in this paragraph can be found in Appellant’s Opening 
Brief in the Sixth District Court of Appeal, supra note 20. 
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sperm for Susan’s insemination. He intended only to provide semen 
for creating embryos that would be implanted in his wife and to birth 
a child that would be raised by them together. In the language of the 
AI statute, Robert “provided” sperm, but not to impregnate “a woman 
other than the donor’s wife,”129 although that is what literally 
happened. He is also not, in the ordinary use of the term, a 
“donor.”130 He did not donate his sperm to the fertility doctors, to a 
sperm bank, or to Susan. He and Denise intended for Denise to 
gestate a child or children they would rear together. But within the 
existing statutory framework, the AI section is the closest thing there 
is to a regime adopted with assistive techniques in mind. The Code’s 
AI provisions embraced this first ARTs technique, arranged 
parenthood apart from biology or marital status, and protected the 
resulting voluntary family units from outside intrusion. If Robert is 
not treated as tantamount to a sperm donor under section 7613(b), his 
claim, as argued above, fits no better and quite possibly less well 
under any other aspect of California’s statutory paternity scheme.131  
Even if Robert does not fit perfectly into section 7613(b), why 
should there be a yawning gulf between the legal protection accorded 
to a marital family unit and that accorded to a single woman’s parent-
child family? In ordinary reproduction, the conclusiveness of the 
marital presumption has steadily eroded for the past fifteen years.132 
The traditional preference for two-parent over single-parent families 
has also somewhat eroded in various settings, including in paternity 
determinations for children born out of wedlock as well as in 
 129. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2004). 
 130. Use of the word “donor” has been slippery in ARTs. For example, “donor” ordinarily 
connotes a gift-giver, but sperm donors are usually paid. The 2002 revised Uniform Parentage 
Act defines “donor” as “an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted 
reproduction, whether or not for consideration,” but excludes from that definition “a husband 
who provides sperm . . . to be used for assisted reproduction by the wife.” UNIF. PARENTAGE 
ACT § 102(8) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 9 (Supp. 2005). 
 131. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 132. See, e.g., Craig L. v, Sandy S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 607–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that a biological father who was permitted by the mother and the mother’s husband to 
establish a relationship with his child could qualify as a presumed father and could therefore 
initiate paternity proceedings). See generally Batya F. Smernoff, Comment, California’s 
Conclusive Presumption of Paternity and the Expansion of Unwed Father’s Rights, 26 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 337 (1996) (outlining a California trend to allow unwed fathers to challenge 
the marital presumption). 
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adoptive placements.133 Considerable effort has been devoted for 
many decades to eradicating social and legal distinctions between 
marital (“legitimate”) and non-marital (“illegitimate”) children.134 
The general trend has been toward making less distinction between 
various family forms, including between single or dual parent 
configurations. 
Justifications for a two-parent preference are even less persuasive 
when ARTs are used than in traditional reproduction. Single mothers 
utilizing ARTs are generally more economically stable135 and their 
intentions to form a single parent unit are clearer than is true for 
many single female parents whose children result from sexual 
relations whether within or outside of marriage. Indeed, the 
formalized intentions that accompany the use of ARTs would 
arguably satisfy at least some of the purposes served by marriage—
the making of a formal and deliberate intimate commitment in this 
instance to bear and raise a child. These points suggest that, in a 
situation like Susan and Robert’s, a less literal threshold than the 
Sixth District panel required for applying section 7613(b) would have 
yielded results better aligned with both the factual characteristics of 
and the policy justifications for determinations of parentage in ARTs 
disputes.136 Susan and Daniel’s family unit should have received the 
same protection against intrusion by the sperm provider that Susan 
expected and that other single women would have been accorded 
 133. Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th 816, 845–46 (Cal. 1992) (pointing out that single 
adoptive parents are becoming significantly more common).  
 134. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 5–6 (Supp. 2004). 
The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act shunned the term “illegitimate,” choosing instead to use the 
term “child with no presumed father.” Id. at 5. The 2002 Uniform Parentage Act amendments 
apply the provisions of Article 7 to non-marital as well as to marital children born as a result of 
assisted reproductive technologies. Id. at 6; see also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778–79 
(Cal. 1993) (noting that the purpose of the Uniform Parentage Act was to eliminate such 
distinctions). Although elimination of legitimacy distinctions sometimes led to affirming the 
rights and responsibilities of unwed biological fathers, they also recognize the rights of single 
parents, both male and female. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 135. The average cost in the United States in 1998 of an in vitro fertilization (IVF) cycle 
was $12,400. American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Frequently Asked Questions About 
Infertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2005). Success with IVF 
increases with the number of cycles attempted, up to four cycles. Id. 
 136. In representing Susan, we argued that despite the lack of perfect fit between section 
7613(b) and the facts at hand, this code section was the most appropriate statutory guidance 
available for the resolution of this dispute.  
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under section 7613(b). Even in the face of the mistaken transfer, if 
Susan had been married when she used IVF, her family would have 
received such protection under section 7613(a).137  
If Susan were accorded the protection of section 7613, Robert and 
Denise would lose an embryo that became a child that was 
genetically Robert’s progeny, but about whom they knew nothing 
until disclosure of the doctors’ mistake over ten months after Daniel 
was born. Their loss is certainly substantive and painful and they are 
in no way to blame for the events that ensnared all the parties to this 
conflict. The more Robert and Denise view embryos as akin to 
unborn children and the less able they are to have the additional 
children they wanted, the more their loss is magnified. But theirs is, 
in my view, a lesser loss than the disruption of a family unit that 
Susan, with equal innocence, had planned, established and enjoyed 
during the months of her pregnancy and for almost a year after Daniel 
was born. Even under the resolution imposed by the courts, Robert 
did not get what he wanted. Instead of receiving full custody and 
having Denise declared Daniel’s legal mother, Robert received legal 
parenthood, but only a portion of Daniel’s time and rearing. Susan, 
too, received legal parental status, but she must also share her and her 
child’s next eighteen years with a complete stranger, and will likely 
bear continued frequent conflict, criticism, and litigation over making 
such an uncomfortable situation work.  
V. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD  
The use of assisted reproductive techniques may matter in 
determining parental status, but procreative methods seem less likely 
to have relevance when the focus shifts to the best interests of the 
child. Elsewhere, I have argued that, in many ways, the interests of 
children converge with the interests of the parents who rear them.138 
Where those interests do not converge, dependency laws are as 
applicable to problems of deficient parenting of children of assisted 
 137. California Family Code section 7541(e)(2) prevents a biological father from 
challenging parental status assigned under section 7613. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(e)(2) (West 
2004). 
 138. See Shultz, supra note 5, at 341–46. 
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reproduction as they are to deficient parenting of children brought 
into the world in any other fashion. Where conflict arises during the 
child’s minority regarding education, health care, or custody and 
visitation, the dominant standard courts rely on to resolve such 
conflict is the best interests of the child.139 Recently, the question 
arose in California as to whether or not the best interests of the child 
should be a formal and significant factor in determining initial 
parental status.  
A. The Dispute over Best Interests in Johnson 
In Johnson v. Calvert,140 a dispute over maternity arising from the 
birth of a child to a gestational surrogate, the California Supreme 
Court engaged in a brief but heated exchange over this issue.141 In a 
footnote to the majority opinion, Justice Panelli observed that: 
 The dissent would decide parentage based on the best 
interests of the child. Such an approach raises the repugnant 
specter of governmental interference in matters implicating our 
most fundamental notions of privacy, and confuses concepts of 
parentage and custody. Logically, the determination of 
parentage must precede, and should not be dictated by, 
eventual custody decisions.142 
This footnote was provoked by dissenting Justice Kennard’s 
insistence that the best interests of the child should have been 
considered in determining parentage.143 Justice Kennard rejected 
what she saw as the majority’s claim that the UPA would not 
consider a child’s best interests in an initial determination of 
 139. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3020, 2040-43 (West 2004) (child custody provisions). 
 140. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), was the first modern ARTs dispute to 
reach the California Supreme Court. But see People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968) 
(holding a husband who consented to his wife’s artificial insemination with another man’s 
sperm to be the lawful father of the child in a criminal action for child support). 
 141. Johnson, 851 P.2d 776. The “temperature” was likely raised by Justice Kennard’s use 
of the rather extreme example of a parent selling a child into slavery in her attack on the 
majority’s adoption of an intent-based standard to determine legal motherhood. Id. at 779 n.4 
(Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 782 n.10 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 789, 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
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parentage. She pointed out that the best interests test is relevant 
whenever a minor’s welfare is at stake, including not only adoption, 
temporary placement, and custody or visitation, but also when 
termination of parental rights is adjudicated. She urged that the 
minor’s welfare is relevant to the determination of parental status 
because “[f]actors that are pertinent to good parenting, and thus that 
are in a child’s best interests, include the ability to nurture the child 
physically and psychologically, and to provide ethical and intellectual 
guidance.”144 
Those accustomed to reading parental status cases may find it 
somewhat odd that this issue sparked conflict. Justice Panelli’s note 
outlined the usual approach; what was unusual was the need to spell 
it out. Best interests is ordinarily the standard when questions not 
about parental status but about the placement or life circumstances of 
a child are in dispute. The counter-examples Justice Kennard noted in 
dissent do not really involve the original assignment of parental 
status. Custody, visitation and temporary placement turn on the 
child’s best interests, but they are not determinations of parenthood. 
Adoption may occur very early in a child’s life, but it is a legal re-
assignment of parentage. Termination of parental rights does involve 
parenthood, but it usually operates either as a prelude to adoption or 
as a consequence of de facto abandonment or deficient parenting. In 
other words, initial determinations of parenthood establish who has a 
starting seat at the table. Decisions about the child’s future, on the 
other hand, are made by those at the table, and are reviewed under a 
best interests standard. 
Judicial dispute about something so seemingly ordinary suggests 
that the Justices sensed something unusual in Johnson. That 
something may not have been so much a matter of ordinary doctrine 
as it was the product of unarticulated differences between coital and 
assisted reproduction. As outlined above, determining parental status 
in coital reproduction involves assessing the adult parties’ marital 
relationship to each other and/or the biological connections between 
parent and child that stem from sexual relations between the adults.145 
 144. Id. at 800 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 145. See supra Part II. Decisions jointly made by mother and father regarding a child’s 
parentage, such as a voluntary declaration or a “holding out,” may also establish paternity. See 
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Such disputes usually concern paternity because birth itself ordinarily 
sufficiently signifies the genetic and gestational relationship between 
a woman and a child. Except when paternity is assigned on the basis 
of the (eroding) marital presumption, determining initial parental 
status is essentially a matter of proving the identity of the man who 
was the source of the genetically identifiable sperm. Considerations 
of the child’s best interests are essentially irrelevant to this question 
of identity.  
When techniques of collaborative reproduction are used, however, 
more than simple identity of a parent is at issue. As is true in coital 
reproduction, biology and marriage (or other committed intimate 
connection) may well be motivators to engage in ARTs. But people 
turn to ARTs not only to assure biological connection or to enhance 
an intimate relationship (marital or otherwise). Rather, they turn to 
ARTs precisely because ARTs allow substitution for or repair of 
biological and/or social elements of reproduction that are absent or 
broken. To govern this significantly different context with rules 
developed to govern coital reproduction is wrong-headed. The 
Justices disputing the applicable standard in Johnson may have 
intuited that a broader and somewhat different array of considerations 
should affect the way ARTs parentage disputes are resolved. A 
framework is needed that places the overall situation in perspective, 
one that looks not just at individual genetic identity but also at the 
nature of the claims and the relationships of the claimants. I suspect 
that this widened perspective is what Justice Kennard was seeking 
when she urged the application of a best interests standard in 
Johnson. But in resisting her urging, the majority rightly recognized 
that most of the examples she gave were more about parental fitness 
than about issues distinctive to initial assignment of parental status. 
In my view, the Johnson majority was right to adopt an intent-
based standard of parentage that gave effect to the ARTs agreement 
between the parties.146 The Johnson dispute arose because one of the 
supra note 59. 
 146. The majority cited my earlier article, Shultz, supra note 5. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782–
83. Justice Kennard commented that “[t]he intent of the genetic mother to procreate a child is 
certainly relevant to the question of the child's best interests; alone, however, it should not be 
dispositive.” Id. at 800 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
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parties to a surrogacy agreement wanted to change her mind after the 
birth. Intentions, as expressed in voluntary agreements, should 
matter. The agreement between the three adults was what caused the 
child to be conceived. I would give effect to those expressed 
intentions in assigning parental status. Like Justice Panelli in footnote 
ten, I would not inquire into issues of personal or individual fitness 
that are the typical focus of custody or dependency hearings most 
akin to Justice Kennard’s examples. Dependency statutes are the 
most appropriate way to protect a child from major failings or 
incapacities of their individual parents.  
Although I disagree with Justice Kennard’s analysis of Johnson,147 
I share her concern that a broader set of issues should sometimes be 
considered in determining parental status. For me, the category to 
which such a widened perspective is essential is parentage disputes 
that occur in the context of ARTs. The vital factual differences 
between coital and assisted reproduction require differences in legal 
response. Had the Johnson majority been inclined to follow the 
approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Susan’s case, it could 
have literally followed the code section stating that the woman who 
gives birth is the legal mother.148 Instead, the court recognized that 
the separation of genetic and gestational roles under ARTs raised new 
issues not envisioned by the existing statutes. Relying partly on 
gender-neutral readings of other parentage code sections, the court 
first determined that both the gestator and the woman who provided 
the ovum could claim maternal status. To resolve the resulting 
conflict, the majority based important parts of its decision on factors 
such as intentionality that differentiate assisted reproductive 
techniques from traditional coital procreation.149  
Justice Kennard’s label for broader considerations was the best 
interests. Best interests is not the only principle that courts could use 
to expand what they take into account in deciding ARTs parentage. It 
 147. Although I disagree with her application of that broader perspective in Johnson, we 
might reach more similar conclusions in Susan’s case. Justice Kennard voted to grant Susan’s 
petition for review. Because the Court did not grant review, I cannot, of course, predict what 
her views about Susan’s case might have been. 
 148. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 780 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003 (current version at CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 7610 (West 2004))). 
 149. Id. at 780–82. 
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is simply the most familiar one. The broadened inquiry itself is more 
important than the name it goes by. Calling it best interests, however, 
would likely be problematic. It would legitimize a wider inquiry, but 
because of the differing contexts in which that standard is typically 
applied, it might also muddy the waters. The best interests standard is 
famously porous, allowing judges to consider an unrestrained array of 
factors not relevant for assigning initial parental status when 
conception occurred through typical coital means. What is needed is 
more precise. Deliberations in ARTs parentage cases should include 
factors that reflect the differences inherent in these procreative 
processes and arrangements. The Johnson majority properly rejected 
the best interests standard per se, but its analysis thoughtfully 
considered the important factors that distinguish ARTs procreation 
from traditional coital reproduction. That consideration is crucial to 
fair resolution of ARTs disputes. 
B. Susan’s Case and Best Interests 
Unlike Johnson, there was no agreement between Susan and 
Robert that could resolve their dispute on the basis of an intent 
standard. But the judges weighing Susan’s case should have taken 
into account distinctive features of the dispute that derived from the 
parties’ use of ARTs. In various ways, Susan asked the court to 
consider those aspects of the situation. Robert’s attorneys countered 
that best interests evidence was inappropriate, citing Johnson.150 As 
the case unfolded, the narrow and literal approach prevailed. 
Differences stemming from ARTs were omitted from the 
deliberation.  
As already noted, both the trial and appellate courts held that 
section 7613, the only code section directly relevant to an ARTs 
procedure, did not apply because its language did not exactly fit this 
situation. They held that statutes governing ordinary paternity actions 
and biological testing should be narrowly and literally followed 
 150. See, e.g., Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 31, at 4; Respondant’s 
Answer to Petition for Review at 27, Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2003) (No. 1-02-CP-010574). 
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without consideration of factual or policy differences.151 Other 
judicial choices by the judges in Susan’s case are also illustrative. 
Susan’s briefs called attention to the disruption of Daniel’s 
constitutional right to a stable placement,152 but the court was not 
responsive. Narrowing the focus both legally and factually, the Sixth 
District first cited the practice of addressing constitutional questions 
only when no other grounds are available.153 It then scolded Susan for 
“speculating,” saying that “much of Susan’s appellate argument is a 
misdirected attack on any future effort Robert and Denise might make 
to obtain custody.”154 With its jab about “speculation,” the court ruled 
out as premature Susan’s efforts to place the dispute in its distinctive 
context. It also disregarded prior statements and pleadings showing 
that Robert and Denise believed they should have sole custody of 
Daniel, leaving on the table only Robert’s later, more moderate and 
strategic assertions. The court also ignored Susan’s observation that 
Denise’s concurrent appeal of the dismissal of her maternity action 
was incompatible with the couple’s purported “acceptance” of 
Susan’s role as Daniel’s mother.155  
Just prior to oral argument before the Court of Appeal, Susan 
submitted and urged the court to consider a psychological/custody 
evaluation, which had been ordered by the trial court, but just then 
received. Susan’s request was premised on the fact that Daniel’s best 
interest “hangs in the balance.”156 Robert responded emphatically, 
citing footnote ten in Johnson, and calling the report “an 
inappropriate attempt to confuse the issues and prejudice Robert’s 
right to a decision on the merits of her parentage challenge.”157 
 151. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 152. Appellant’s Opening Brief in the Sixth District Court of Appeal, supra note 20, at 19–
20. For a similar argument, see In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 523–24, 533–34 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996) (emphasizing a child’s individual rights to stable placement in a dispute over the 
validity of an adoption challenged under the Indian Child Welfare Act). 
 153.  Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Appellant’s Opening Brief in the Sixth District Court of Appeal, supra note 20, at 24. 
 156. Susan B’s Motion to Take Additional Evidence at 2, Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 1-02-CP-010574). Susan’s request for appointment of a 
guardian ad litem for Daniel was likewise refused.  
 157. Robert B.’s Opposition to Susan B.’s Motion to Take Additional Evidence at 6, 
Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 1-02-CP-010574). 
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Without comment, the Sixth District refused to consider the 
evidence.158 
Especially when combined with its narrow and literal construction 
of statutes, the court’s exclusion of any broader evidence placed 
Susan in a double bind. Instructed that her principal concerns were 
premature or speculative with no legitimate bearing on the paternity 
action, Susan also found it difficult to be heard in the next phase 
concerning custody. As if faced with a dispute over parentage after 
traditional reproduction, the courts initially focused solely on whether 
a genetic link existed between Robert and Daniel.159 Once the genetic 
connection was established, they saw the paternity determination as 
routine. Once the paternity determination became final, Robert’s 
undisputed personal fitness as a parent was sufficient to earn him 
substantial legal and physical custody.160  
The cumulative effect of these judicial choices was to ignore the 
distinctiveness of ARTs and the appropriateness and effect of giving 
Robert a permanent role in Daniel’s life. The reduced role of 
genetics, the mistake that could not even have occurred in coital 
procreation, the nineteen month delay before discovery of that 
mistake,161 the disregard for the legislative intention to allow 
 158. The court also refused motions by Robert to take judicial notice of documents 
(regarding a dispute over mediation) that were filed after the trial judgment became final, to 
take notice of documents obtained after oral argument regarding the medical malpractice cases 
against the fertility doctor, and to strike certain assertions by Susan that Robert claimed to be 
unsupported. It refused a motion by Denise to take judicial notice of matters regarding Susan’s 
physician-patient confidentiality that were disputed during discovery and that Denise claimed 
adversely affected the court’s ruling as to her standing. 
 159. Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The trial court 
ordered genetic testing. Id. Susan challenged the order for genetic testing by writ petition, 
which the appellate court summarily denied. Id. at 786 n.3. 
 160. The trial court has gradually increased Robert’s contact with Daniel, awarding him 
considerable physical and joint legal custody.  
 161. The longer a child is reared (and gestated) by someone else, the weaker the relevance 
of genetic connection should be. Because a very young child is developing so quickly, and 
because his or her attachment needs are so great, units of time are more important early in life 
rather than later. A balancing test of factors that includes some concept of time-based estoppel 
seems appropriate in determining parentage. This is especially so given that neither Robert nor 
Susan was responsible for the error or for the delay in revealing it. Although Robert has no 
culpability for the delay, Susan’s equal innocence should allow her to cite the delay as a 
legitimately relevant factor. In this respect, the situation is distinguishable from instances where 
a mother has prevented a biological father from knowing he has a child or from having contact 
with that child. In such a situation, a mother’s conduct might arguably reduce the salience of a 
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unmarried women to create a protected family unit, the imposition of 
a de facto family on total strangers who had no prior consensual 
relationship whatsoever162—all these elements deserved the court’s 
attention and concern. Instead, the courts’ narrow interpretations and 
sharp separation of parentage and custody deprived Susan’s principal 
arguments of relevance either in the parentage determination or in 
subsequent custody decisions. In a real sense, the issues that were 
most important from Susan’s vantage point simply disappeared from 
the case.  
The quality of legal analysis is not all that suffered. Judicial 
failure to grapple with the real difficulties in this dispute imposed 
costs on the child at its center. Persistent and disturbing conflict has 
already dominated not only the adults’ lives but also the child’s for 
the more than three years since this case began. Although emotional 
and economic support from two sources might, as a general and 
theoretical matter, be better for a child, the actual need for two 
sources in this case is far from established. Although the future is 
always unknown, facts at the time of this dispute suggested little 
likelihood of a need for a second parent’s economic support.163 By 
father’s delay in establishing a relationship with the child. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 
(1983) (allowing an adoption to proceed because the biological father’s failure to register as a 
putative father foreclosed his further claim to notice of the pending adoption of his child). In 
dissent, Justice White urged that the biological father should not be deprived of his rights to 
object if the mother prevented him from seeing his child. Id. at 271. But see In re Jerry P., 116 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that paternity and dependency codes 
violate a man’s constitutional rights, despite his not being the biological father, to the extent 
that they permit a mother to unilaterally deny presumed father status by preventing him from 
receiving the child into his home). 
 162. The Baby M outcome had certain similarities in that it named the surrogate as the 
child’s mother and the intending parent-husband as the father, forcing them to share the child. 
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988). The Baby M case was less egregious, however, 
in that the surrogate and the intending husband at least had a connection through their pre-
conception agreement, even though the New Jersey Supreme Court ignored that agreement. Id. 
at 1236, 1240. 
 163. Based on Susan’s circumstances before the dispute, and in view of nearby availability 
of members of her family, the likelihood is that Daniel would only need to rely on a second 
parent if something drastic, like Susan’s death or disability, occurred. For that matter, Susan 
might enter a new relationship that would consensually bring a second adult into Daniel’s life. 
Perhaps single parents should be required to designate a second person (their own parent, 
sibling or friend) to become responsible for the child were the single parent to become unable to 
care for him or her. A person in Robert’s shoes might even be so designated, although there 
would be objections to such a designation. Evaluation of this idea is beyond the scope of this 
article. Another possibility would have some points in common with Justice Stevens’ 
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contrast, the odds of disruptive conflict between two strangers 
unwillingly entwined for eighteen years by court order seem quite 
high. This factor, too, was effaced by the courts’ approach to this 
dispute. 
The broadened analysis I recommend for ARTs disputes would 
not solely have favored Susan. Beyond the genetic link that so 
entranced the judges, Robert had other points that weighed in his 
favor. In particular, the intensity of his commitment to parenting is 
compelling. For courts that too often deal with men fitting the 
“deadbeat dads” stereotype, it must have been difficult for the judges 
to turn their backs on a ready, willing, and able father who both 
asserts and demonstrates that he wants to actively parent his child. 
Robert’s paternal instincts stretch far beyond being a father in name. 
He reportedly has good relations with his step-children and is 
apparently a good father to the daughter born of his and Denise’s 
fertility treatment. Certainly, he has spent significant amounts of 
money and time seeking paternity of Daniel,164 and he and part of his 
family have endured the hardship of relocating for extended periods 
of time so that he can become acquainted with Daniel at the slow and 
deliberate pace set by the court in order to protect the child from 
abrupt dislocation.  
These factors speak well of Robert. They are, however, largely 
matters of individual fitness. Susan, too, is unquestionably a fit 
parent. Individual fitness is not what I have called “ARTs-specific” 
and is the kind of evidence that will be adequately addressed in the 
ordinary assignment of custody. Leaving such evidence for custody 
hearings is, therefore, entirely appropriate. By contrast, the elements 
that should not have been left out of the calculus are those that are 
context-dependent, rather than person-dependent. They are, in other 
words, factors that are derived from the use of ARTs rather than from 
the personal qualities of the individuals involved. It is these “ARTs-
suggestion that a genetic father excluded from legal parenthood might gain visitation by 
showing that this would serve the best interests of the child. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 
110, 133 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). For general California provisions regarding visitation 
rights, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100 (West 2004). 
 164. One can be reasonably confident of this based on the duration of the litigation and the 
number of lawyers involved in representing both Robert and Denise. 
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specific” elements that are my focus in recommending a broadened 
analysis of parentage.  
Another possible solution would be for courts to assign legal 
paternity to someone in Robert’s shoes on the basis of genetic 
connection, but then to weigh the ARTs-specific elements as perhaps 
dictating that the child’s interests would best be served by denying 
that genetic parent custody or any visitation not voluntarily agreed to 
by the person in Susan’s shoes. Such an approach would have the 
advantage of allowing the child to know the biological parent’s 
medical and genetic history, and also of permitting the child and 
genetic parent to develop a relationship once the child was grown if 
they so chose. However, such a solution might create too much 
cognitive dissonance. It might also require unusual clear-sightedness 
for a court to adopt or for the parties to accept such an arrangement. 
Identifying someone as a genetic parent and recognizing that person 
as a fit or even good parent, but nevertheless denying contact, would 
be difficult for the judge and the excluded parent alike. 
C. Other Relevant Factors in Robert v. Susan 
Several other factors are what I have called “ARTs-specific” and 
are in my view relevant in determining parentage. For example, 
Robert and Denise are also the parents of a child born at 
approximately the same time as Daniel through the transfer of 
embryos whose genetic progenitors were the same as Daniel’s. They 
contend that Daniel and their child are genetic twins who have a right 
to enjoy a robust relationship with each other.165 Susan’s claims 
rested heavily on her right to the legal protection of her intact family 
unit. Some would see the separation of these two children as 
implicated, especially from the child’s eye view, in the completeness 
of the family unit. But the children would be fraternal rather than 
identical genetic twins, as they are the product of two different 
fertilized ova. Whether it is appropriate to characterize two children 
gestated in different women’s wombs as twins is debatable. 
 165. I am indebted to Susan Appleton, Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins Professor of 
Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, for calling my attention to this point. 
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Questions regarding the relation between two children gestated by 
different women could only arise when ARTs were used. They 
would, then, be appropriate for consideration under my proposal for a 
broadened review of ARTs differentiated factors in parentage 
disputes. In my view, the “sibling” relationship between these two 
children would not outweigh Susan’s arguments for denying Robert’s 
paternity, but reasonable others might differ. The parties might also 
be willing to allow such a relationship to develop on a voluntary 
rather than a court-imposed basis. Again, once the children were 
grown, they might themselves choose to build a connection with one 
another. 
Another ARTs-derived issue involves Denise’s role as a claimant 
to parental status. Full discussion of her legal standing is beyond my 
scope here, but I believe that in some circumstances a claim like 
Denise’s might have greater validity than it did on these facts. Denise 
claimed that, as the wife of a man whose reproductive capacities 
played a role in the creation of a child through ARTs, she should 
stand in the same position as the husband of a woman who consents 
to her artificial insemination with donor sperm and thereby becomes 
the legal father. Although gestation and sperm production differ 
greatly in effort, risk, and bonding, Family Code section 7613(a) 
should arguably allow for gender reversal in the statutorily assigned 
roles. Consequently, where a wife’s ova may be incapable of 
fertilization, but her husband is fertile, the couple should be able to 
use donor ova and embryo transfer to enable the wife to bear a child 
the couple intends to parent and the law should recognize them as the 
child’s legal parents. 
Susan’s claim to maternity is even stronger than this hypothetical 
variant of Denise’s situation because although neither she nor Denise 
had a genetic relation to Daniel, Susan gestated and for a number of 
months exclusively reared Daniel. Those facts, together with others 
noted above in the paternity analysis, cement Susan’s claim to be 
Daniel’s mother. However, had there been an agreement with a 
willing gestational surrogate who changed her mind and wanted to 
keep the child, or if the ova donor had sought parental rights as 
against Denise as gestator, Denise’s theory under section 7613(a) 
should carry some weight, even though the statute on its face speaks 
only to the reversed genders. Because these situations involve a 
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voluntary agreement that one party subsequently seeks to abandon, 
such cases would be resolved by the intent-based approach employed 
in Johnson. Moreover, although I am unaware of any actual facts that 
precisely parallel the hypothetical just put forth, decisions in cases 
such as Marriage of Buzzanca166 incorporate elements akin to my 
suggested analysis of these Denise-variant hypotheticals. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The dispute between Robert and Susan arose from a mistake that 
could only have occurred where assisted reproductive techniques 
were used to solve biological and interpersonal barriers to 
procreation. Tragic as this mistake is for both of these innocent 
parties, I believe that given the length of time before the mistake was 
disclosed, the better outcome in Susan’s case would have been for the 
courts to prevent Robert from establishing paternity. It would be 
better to ask Robert to face the loss of an embryo, who has now 
become a child, whose very existence was unknown to him before 
this belated dispute, than to permanently impose a stranger into the 
planned and harmonious family unit of an already-situated and 
treasured child.167 The courts’ literal analysis of isolated sections of a 
code adopted to govern a different time and a different reality was 
myopic and overly rigid. It produced troubling and perverse results.  
Assisted reproduction dilutes the ordinary importance of genetics 
because those procedures are employed in ways that segment, repair 
and otherwise alter the biological process of reproduction. Those 
methods, as well as the family configurations and plans of the people 
who employ them, do not map neatly onto categories designed for 
ordinary procreation methods and relationships. Assisted 
reproductive techniques are legal and widely used. The problems they 
raise require a different calculus than the problems of parenthood 
 166. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Writing for the 
court, Judge Sills directly addressed the ARTs-specific nature of the case and stressed the 
importance of the parties’ intentions despite the absence of a genetic or gestational connection. 
Id. at 290. His discussion includes a consideration of gender equity as well. Id. at 285. 
 167. Cf. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8 (“To recognize parental rights in a third 
party with whom the Calvert family has had little contact since shortly after the child's birth 
would diminish Crispina’s role as mother.”). 
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addressed by a statute written in 1973 before most of those methods 
emerged.168 
Problems that arise from the lack of an appropriate modern statute 
are further exacerbated when courts apply existing statutes in a 
narrow and literal way, closing their eyes to factual context and 
congruent policy. The difficulty and novelty of ARTs disputes 
understandably pulls courts eager to avoid judicial adventurism 
toward literal interpretation of legislation and causes them to avoid 
explicit policy considerations. But in the absence of statutes that 
contemplate the altered set of issues that assisted reproduction 
presents, that is exactly the wrong instinct. 
The differences between “standard” parenthood disputes and those 
arising from ARTs demand that courts expand the range of factors 
and evidence that they will entertain. It is no accident that the dispute 
about whether to address best interests in parentage actions arose in 
Johnson, California’s first significant state supreme court decision 
regarding an ARTs dispute. Until legislatures establish the principles 
that should regulate these distinctive parentage disputes, judges will 
be deciding what policies to adopt even if they purport to simply 
adopt the plain meaning of existing statutes. As applied to ARTs 
disputes, those statutes are obsolete in all but a technical sense. Susan 
and Daniel, Robert, Denise, and their children were all victims of this 
judicial short-sightedness. 
 168. Louise Brown, the first “test tube baby,” was born in 1978 in England. See Carol 
Lawson, Celebrated Birth Aside, Teen-Ager Is Typical Now, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at A18. 
A number of years passed before IVF and other techniques came into the widespread use that 
they enjoy today. 
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